CHINA AND BRITAIN

BY

R. O. HALL

"A valuable addition to the large current output of writings on China because it is permeated with a definite kind of sympathy not often found in published comments on Chinese affairs. . . . Mr Hall's distinction is that he is not afraid to bring fundamentals into the picture. His shrewd comments on the typical, contrasted virtues of China and Great Britain, and on the chief points of friction, show that he is not simply a visionary, he accepts facts, but applies to all of them the rigorous standards of uncompromising Christianity."

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To all those in China, both Chinese and Foreign
who have given us so generously
of their friendship
and their help

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS book was undertaken, with very great hesitation, at the insistent request of a group of friends. It is not the book they expected. I am, therefore, alone responsible for its contents.

It is not exhaustive, or detailed, or scholarly. It does not deal with politics, economics, or religion, except in so far as the life interests of plain people can be classified as political, economic, or religious.

It is written by a plain man for plain people in terms which are, I hope, plain terms.

I have endeavoured to be as fair and accurate in the presentation of facts as very limited experience in China makes fairness and accuracy possible. Experienced readers will detect that I have kept company as much with Chinese as with British minds. They will not, I hope, consider this a disadvantage in a discussion of Sino-British relations. My desire is primarily to ask questions and to make tentative suggestions as to methods of approaching the whole issue which will, I hope, take the heat out of the argument. Only if the heat is taken out of the argument can the people of China and Britain come to know each other better, and so work together for the ideals of brotherhood and

mutual service which they both have so very much at heart.

My debts to others are too numerous to mention; my use of what they have given me too insignificant to couple with their names.

R. O. H.

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CHINA AND BRITAIN

CHAPTER I

THE PRESENT

THERE were eight of us, three Chinese and five Englishmen. Our discussion began, as discussions do begin after dinner, with everything in general. It came down, as is the way when Englishmen are about, to a very definite issue in particular: whether or not the Chinese could carry on the Customs service without serious loss in efficiency and probity if every foreigner were withdrawn to-morrow.

Chu and Lin were rather desperately trying to shift the argument on to more favourable ground. A definite affirmative was obviously impossible. It would, of course, be impossible in any public service anywhere to remove such a large proportion of responsible officials and still carry on without serious loss in efficiency. A negative would have been seized on by the British contingent as proving their whole position, and would have been held on to in genuine bull-dog fashion.

The atmosphere was growing unpleasantly tense when our host came to the rescue by drawing in Zung, who had sat in silence throughout the discussion. His points were simple and direct. "We are the children of the past. Circumstances over which the British had little control drove them out

into the Far East in search of trade and treasure. In the interests of trade, which profited both countries, they have secured a certain privileged position in China. China has surrendered trade advantages unwillingly because she had to, not because she wanted to. To-day the situation is changing. The era of white expansion is closing, if not already closed. And China is steadily developing a national consciousness which she did not possess before the Revolution. Inevitably, then, British psychology to-day is dominated by the perfectly legitimate desire to retain what she has secured in the past. And China is daily becoming more and more determined to recover what she has lost in the past. Given such a state of mind, even facts necessarily appear in a different light in accordance with the bias of the national interest of the speaker."

He clenched his fists, and holding them up showed us the direct clash of two opposing forces, and then —"My concern," he said, "is to provide cushions to break the shock of the conflict." There was an instantaneous chorus of approval. The heat was taken out of the argument.

I believe that the present Sino-British misunderstanding can only be appreciated against the background of this much larger issue: the clash between the commercial expansion of the white races and a developing national consciousness, which, though intensified by Western commercial expansion, is in itself only one phase of an independent political development. The roots of this conflict are in the past.

CHAPTER II

THE PAST

MODERN commercial contacts between China and Britain began in 1697. Political contacts did not begin for another century. In 1793 Lord Macartney headed a mission to Peking. Quotations from writers on both sides will illustrate the spirit in which relations between the two countries were continued in the years that followed this mission. "The barbarians are like beasts, and not to be ruled by the same principles as the Chinese. Were one to attempt to control them by the great maxims of reason it would tend to nothing but the greatest confusion." Words of that kind were then the common currency of official China. But it is surprising to read them, as in this case, in the writings of a great Confucian scholar (Sung Tung Po). On the British side Lord Elgin's dictum is well known: "The Chinese yield nothing to reason and everything to fear." Both peoples have entered then upon a legacy of fear and suspicion and contempt which must inevitably influence the present situation.

The history of these relations in its main outlines can be very briefly told. The United East India Company had until 1834 the monopoly of British trade. Trade was limited by the Chinese govern-

ment to Canton, and even in Canton was very strictly controlled. It was a difficult business for both sides. The Chinese were obviously much embarrassed by the energy and independent spirit of the foreign traders, who in turn were impatient of Chinese methods, which seemed to them capricious, corrupt, and barbaric. A limited number of Chinese merchants were licensed to conduct all dealings with the foreign traders. Even government officials could only be approached through them. This seemed, of course, an unreasonable and cumbrous method. Cumbrous it certainly was. But responsibility is at the root of Chinese law and of Chinese administration. Dealings with individuals not linked up in some chain of responsibility were practically unknown. Chinese Governors and Viceroys doubtless felt that they had some measure of control when they had under their hand merchants whom they could punish for any misdoings of the foreigners. For the foreigners themselves could always escape in their ships. Relations between the Chinese merchants and the foreigners were on the whole remarkably good. There are many instances of great generosity on both sides, and there was always a very large measure of mutual confidence.

So long as the East India Company monopoly lasted no acute difficulty arose. But when the monopoly was abolished it was necessary that some person or persons should be appointed to replace the Select Committee of the East India Company, which had been in the past the official representative

of the Company in all dealings with the Chinese. The abolition of the monopoly, which meant the abolition of the Select Committee, was naturally not welcomed by the Chinese officials. It meant the removal of a link in the chain of responsibility. They therefore ordered the responsible Chinese merchants to inform the English that they expected a chief to be appointed " to come to Canton for the general management of commercial dealings."

Accordingly, Lord Napier was appointed in 1833 as Chief Superintendent of British Trade with China. This appointment initiated a new era in our relations with China. Lord Napier's position was essentially different from that of the Select Committee. He represented His Majesty King William IV and not a Chartered Company. He was appointed primarily as the guardian of commercial interests; but, as a government official, when he spoke it was on behalf of the whole British nation and not only of British traders in China. In the past, British merchants had been more or less at the mercy of Chinese government officials. Lord Napier's appointment meant that they now had a representative of their own government on the spot. Trade had at last driven China and Britain into direct political contact.

From that day to this the question of the adjustment of relations between China and Britain has hinged on two interlacing issues—

(1) *The question of equality.* Until finally forced to do so by the second Chinese war, China refused

to treat Britain as an equal power. Since that war Britain has not treated China as an equal. It is a deep consciousness of this element of inequality in our attitude that makes China call the treaties which determine our present relations with her "unequal" treaties.

(2) *The overlapping of commercial and political issues.* Relations between us have always been, and are still, on an uneven keel. We are interested primarily in the commercial aspect of those relations, China primarily in the political aspect. Our main concern has been to develop and protect our trade; China's main concern has been to retain and protect her national sovereignty.

A short account of the main features of intercourse in the ensuing few decades will illustrate the continual interplay of these two factors.

The struggle began with a duel between Lord Napier and the Viceroy of the Southern Provinces. The custom was that new arrivals waited at Macao until permission was received to travel to Canton. Lord Napier did not wait for this permission. It was also forbidden to address the Viceroy direct: all communications had to be made through the appointed Chinese merchants. Lord Napier sent his credentials direct to the Viceroy. They were returned unopened. From this point war was inevitable. It was no longer a handful of traders who were being treated with scorn. Lord Napier's words on the subject are significant of the change which

his appointment had brought about: "The Viceroy has committed an outrage on the British crown which should be equally chastised." [1] An emotional aspect, which has not yet lost its hold, had been brought into the situation. The influence of this reference to the crown, or to the flag, was very marked at home. When the war was actually in progress Gladstone made great play with it in a speech in the House in April of 1840. Lord Morley introduces an extract from his speech by saying:

> This transaction began to make Mr Gladstone uneasy, as was indeed to be expected in anybody who held that a state should have a conscience . . . his speech abounded in the pure milk of what was to be the Gladstonian word:
>
> "Mr Macaulay spoke last night in eloquent terms of the British flag waving in glory at Canton, and of the animating effect produced upon the minds of our sailors by the knowledge that in no country under heaven was it permitted to be insulted. But how comes it to pass that the sight of that flag always raises the spirits of Englishmen? It is because it has always been associated with the cause of justice, with opposition to oppression, with respect for national rights, with honourable commercial enterprise; but now under the auspices of the noble lord [Palmerston] that flag is hoisted to protect an infamous contraband traffic, and if it were never to be hoisted except as it is now hoisted on the coast of China, we should recoil from its sight with horror, and should never again feel our hearts thrill, as they now thrill, with emotion when it floats magnificently and in pride upon the breeze. . . . Although the Chinese were undoubtedly guilty of

[1] Quoted by H. B. Morse in *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, vol. i. p. 142.

much absurd phraseology, of no little ostentatious pride, and of some excess, justice in my opinion is with them, and whilst they the pagans and semi-civilized barbarians have it, we the enlightened and civilized Christians are pursuing objects at variance both with justice and with religion." [1]

It has lately become the fashion to remind missionaries and other "sentimentalists" that the war of 1840 in South China was not an Opium War; that even to the Chinese it was primarily an economic war. All this is perfectly true. The sale of opium was draining the Southern Provinces of silver, whereas in earlier days the balance of trade, and consequently of silver, had been on the Chinese side. American traders particularly had brought large amounts of Mexican silver dollars to pay for the teas and silks of China. A tael of pure silver which had exchanged for a thousand cash now became worth as much as twelve hundred cash. This had a serious effect on Chinese trade, as sales were mostly in cash, whereas taxes were always paid in silver.

And the war was more than an economic war. The fundamental question of equality and of equal treatment was an important element in the dispute. The high-handed actions of Chinese officials, which in a very large measure were the immediate cause of the war, were based ultimately on the refusal of the Chinese government to regard British merchants as more than barbarians.

But we must not therefore suppose that our hands

[1] Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, i. p. 226.

are clean in the matter of opium. The fact that the Chinese government, and for that matter the British government, cared more for economic issues and for questions of equality than for the moral issue of opium smuggling, does not make the opium traffic any less immoral, or our large share in it any less blameworthy. The fact that British citizens were making use of their national position to assist in the smuggling of a prohibited article into another country made the handling of the international issue peculiarly delicate. The difficulty that the British and American governments have experienced over bootlegging by British ships in the Atlantic is a suggestive parallel.

Gladstone was thoroughly right in denouncing the immorality of the war which was being fought as the result of opium smuggling, even if he was wrong in not giving due weight to the other issues involved. We cannot therefore allow our more complete knowledge of the facts of the opium war to relieve us from that "uneasiness" which Lord Morley describes as something to be expected in anyone who held that a state should have a conscience. It is also well to remember that the British government asked, as alternatives, for the cession of an island *or* for right to reside on the mainland. Our representatives took both. Hong-Kong has been British territory ever since. The war was closed by the signing of the Treaty of Nanking. "His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees that British subjects shall be allowed to reside for the purpose of carrying on their mer-

cantile pursuits . . . at the cities and towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc. will appoint superintendents or consular officers to reside at each of the above-named cities or towns, to be the medium of communication between the Chinese authorities and the said merchants." The right of direct approach to Chinese government authorities, which Lord Napier, as a British government official, had been bound to claim, was thus established.

But the question of equality remained unsettled. This treaty was signed by the Chinese solely because the force of arms was against them. It made no difference to their desires in the matter. The old struggle continued. All dealings with foreigners, even with the new consuls, were still confined to the Southern Viceroy, who was supposed to be an expert in handling foreigners. Lord Palmerston, on his side, instructed the Governor of Hong-Kong, who was now British representative in China, " not to descend from the relative position which we have acquired. . . . If we permit the Chinese to resume, as they will no doubt be always endeavouring to do, their former tone of superiority, we shall very soon be compelled to come to blows with them again." [1]

These instructions led to a British punitive expedition to Canton, which achieved nothing but a Chinese imperial decree commending the Cantonese for their patriotism. Palmerston replied with a dispatch, of which a copy was sent to the Emperor of China, only

[1] H. F. Macnair, *Modern Chinese History*, p. 221.

to be returned unopened, accompanied by an edict beginning, " The recent proceeding of foreigners at Tientsin in impudently forwarding dispatches direct to the Ministers of State can be looked upon only as contumacious and insulting in the extreme. . . ." [1] There is still no sign that Britain is to be regarded as an " equal."

The second Anglo-Chinese War was the inevitable result, as Palmerston had indicated, of this unsettled question of equality. The issue was brought to a head by the situation in Canton. Foreign traders were not allowed to reside inside the city. This refusal was the central plank in a deliberate policy intended to make it as difficult as possible for foreigners to have any dealings with the magistrates. The opportunity for declaring war was provided by the *Arrow* incident.

The *Arrow* was a junk, registered in Hong-Kong, with a British master, but owned and manned by Chinese. Either with the deliberate intention of challenging Britain or honestly believing that the crew were pirates, the Chinese officials arrested the crew when the *Arrow* was lying off Canton. The British master was at the time on board another junk. Whether or not the British flag was hauled down, as the master claimed, it is to-day impossible to say. Nor does it very much matter. There could be no peace in South China until either the British or the Chinese had definitely established their mastery. When two governments are exasperated with each

[1] H. F. Macnair, *Modern Chinese History*, p. 231.

other one incident is as good as another as an excuse for war. The value of this particular incident was the alleged insult to the British flag, something tangible for the plain man in England to understand. It took the British five years to settle the question of mastery. China was then convinced that in future Britain must be regarded as a greater power than herself, and respected accordingly. But the question of equality was still unsettled.

Canton was captured in December 1857, and then the expedition sailed north, as it had become clear that the capital must be threatened even more closely than in the previous war if the government were to be convinced of the power of the foreign army. The Taku Forts, at the entrance to the river which leads to Tientsin and so to Peking, were occupied after some delay spent in "conversations," and the British force under Lord Elgin marched to Tientsin. There the Treaty of Tientsin was signed, giving at last to the British and other governments the right to appoint a representative who could reside if he wished at Peking; opening still more ports for foreign trade; and establishing the right of British subjects to extra-territoriality in the matter of both person and property.

As this treaty is typical of the treaties which modern China persists in calling "unequal" treaties, the following extract from Lord Elgin's diary is worth quoting:

On Friday afternoon Baron Gros came to me with a message from the Russian and American

ministers to induce me to recede from two of my demands: (1) a resident minister at Peking, and (2) permission to our people to trade in the interior of China; because, as they said, the Chinese plenipotentiaries had told them that they had received a decree from the Emperor stating that they should infallibly lose their heads if they gave way on these points.

The resident minister at Peking I consider far the most important matter gained by the treaty; the power to trade in the interior hardly less so. . . . I sent for the admiral; gave him a hint that there was a great opportunity for England; that all the powers were deserting me on a point which they had *all* in their original applications to Peking demanded, and which they all intended to claim if I got it; that therefore we had it in our power to claim our place of priority in the East by obtaining this when others would not insist on it. Would he back me?

This was in the forenoon. . . .

I sent Frederick [his brother, Mr Bruce, afterwards appointed first Minister to Peking] to the imperial commissioners to tell them that I was indignant beyond all expression at their having attempted to communicate with me through third parties; that I was ready to sign at once the treaty as it stood: but that if they delayed or retreated, I should consider negotiations at an end, go to Peking and demand a great deal more, etc. Frederick executed this most difficult task admirably, and at six p.m. I signed the Treaty of Tientsin. . . . Though I have been forced to act almost brutally, I am China's friend in all this.[1]

Plainly the question of equality was still not settled. Britain is no longer dictated to, but dictating. There is no real *agreement*.

Meanwhile, the war had not been fought with the

[1] Quoted by H. F. Macnair in *Modern Chinese History*, p. 285–6.

unanimous approval of the British people. Gladstone, who, seventeen years earlier, had championed the cause of China, succeeded in turning out Palmerston's government on a vote of censure in the House, moved in the first instance by Cobden. Lord Morley writes of it as follows:

> The agent of the British Government in the China seas—himself, by the way, a philosophic radical—had forced a war upon the Chinese. The cabinet supported him. On the motion of Cobden, the House censured the proceeding. Mr Gladstone, whose hatred of high-handed iniquities in China had been stirred in early days . . . made the most powerful speech in a remarkable debate. 'Gladstone rose at half-past nine,' Phillimore says (March 3), 'and delivered for nearly two hours an oration which enthralled the House, and which for argument, dignity, eloquence, and effect is unsurpassed by any of his former achievements. It won several votes. Nobody denies that his speech was the finest delivered in the memory of man in the House of Commons.' Apart from a rigorous examination of circumstance and fact in the special case . . . he raised the dispute to higher planes and in most striking language. He examined it both by municipal and international law, and on 'the higher ground of natural justice'—'that justice which binds man to man; which is older than Christianity, because it was in the world before Christianity; which is broader than Christianity, because it extends to the world beyond Christianity; and which underlies Christianity, for Christianity itself appeals to it. . . . War taken at the best is a frightful scourge upon the human race; but because it is so, the wisdom of ages has surrounded it with strict laws and usages, and has required formalities to be observed which shall act as a curb upon the wild passions of man. . . . You have dispensed with all these precautions. You have turned a consul into a diplomatist, and that metamorphosed consul is forsooth to be at liberty to direct the whole might of England against the lives of a defenceless people.' Disraeli in turn denounced proceedings which began in outrage and ended in ruin, mocked at 'No reform, new taxes, Canton blazing, Persia invaded,' as the programme of the party of progress and civilization. . . . Palmerston replied by a stout piece of close argument. . . . But this time in parliament his slender majority failed him.[1]

But the election could not be fought on the issue of the Chinese War. It was decided by the weariness of the electorate. Palmerston was returned because people believed that he was the man who could steer them through the difficulties of the hour. Denunciation of the "insolent barbarian wielding authority at Canton who had violated the British flag" was heard in the election, but it did not reflect the best mind of the country.

Such in briefest outline are some of the issues between China and Britain before the capture of Peking in 1860. The regulation of questions of extra-territoriality; of the exact status of concessions, like Hankow, and of settlements, like Shanghai; and the establishment of the Maritime Customs service, have all taken place against the background of those wars. The old Manchu dynasty, in the last stages of decay, was compelled to yield unwillingly to the energetic demands of the foreign traders and of their national officials. These demands may have

[1] Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, i. p. 568.

been reasonable enough, and the wars may have been as much due to the obscurantism of the imperial household as to the commercial energy of the West. "Your Lordship will see," wrote Lord Napier in 1834, "the urgent necessity of negotiating with such a government, having in your hands at the same time the means of compulsion; to negotiate with them otherwise would be an idle waste of time." In our dealings with China to-day we are apt to forget the past. But the words "Lest we forget" are still upon the walls of the British Legation in Peking. If those words are to remain, let us not forget that China too has memories. If China has used force against us, we have used force against China. If China is apt to forget what we have suffered at her hands, we are apt to forget what China has suffered at ours. No matter on whose side the right, on whose side the wrong, the marks remain. They are facts; we cannot escape their influence. The present is the child of all the past. The legacy of force has never yet been love. Even in China, where we find so many things the direct opposite of our own experience, no exception to this rule has yet been proved.

Shortly after the capture of Peking the Emperor died, and his favourite concubine managed to get herself made joint-regent of her son, the new Emperor. For the next fifty years this remarkable woman held the Manchu dynasty together. She claimed at the end of her life to have made only one mistake—when the Boxer Rising became serious she supported the Boxers.

One would anticipate that an event so dramatic and in many ways so terrible as the Boxer outbreak would still influence the relations of the two countries. But except for a slight undercurrent of fear, which could readily be worked up by adroit propaganda, and a waning interest in China as to the disposal of the British share of the indemnity money, the Boxer episode remains a memory.

Far more important is the long period in which "Old Buddha," as the Empress-Dowager was called in her later years, made no mistakes. During that comparatively stable period Chinese and British commercial interests were inextricably woven together. Compared with the preceding sixty years, and with the eighteen years since her death, there was remarkably little friction. Foreign trade was gradually developed, and side by side with it modern Chinese trade and industry grew up. British and Chinese merchants learned to know and respect and, above all, to trust each other.

Sir Robert Hart's remarkable career, during which he built up from a few *ad hoc* collecting committees at one or two Treaty Ports a postal service which now extends throughout China, and the still more remarkable Maritime Customs service which has been now for years the one stable source of revenue of the central government in Peking, illustrates the way in which British and Chinese worked together, and the remarkable way in which China's foreign trade benefited China as well as those countries who had forced her markets open.

But the growth of the Customs service under foreign control was only possible because, in spite of the firm hand of the Empress-Dowager, the Manchu administration had completely broken down. Because of the insecurity and corrupt administration of the Chinese officials, the Treaty Ports became more and more the centres of wealth and influence. Shanghai, for instance, owes a large measure of its present prosperity, as well as its many thorny problems of municipal administration, to the large number of Chinese who took refuge in the settlement during the Tai-ping rebellion.

Side by side with this commercial development there was, however, a continuance of political conflict which would inevitably, if China had been strong enough, have led to future wars. The "partition" phase in the relations between China and the West is definitely closed now as far as the West is concerned: but its influence remains. The feeling that it aroused in China accounts for a good deal of the meaning that is now expressed by the two words "imperialism" and "exploitation." It is very difficult for China to believe that they are dead issues, in view of the history of the years immediately preceding 1914. If we are to understand China's mind about us at the present time we may well recall some of the episodes of those years.

The following reference to them by a young Chinese international jurist, educated in Britain, shows the impression which those political activities have left on the mind of young China to-day:

The defeat of China by Japan in 1895 revealed the military weakness and inefficiency of this "Great Empire." The powers regarded China as an easy prey, and diverted their attention from the African coasts to China. Thus European encroachment was launched in a wholesale fashion.[1]

The same writer quotes Von Bülow speaking in the Reichstag on German policy in regard to China:

"Mention has been made of a partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought about by us at any rate. All that we have done is to provide that, come what may, we ourselves shall not go empty-handed. The traveller cannot decide when the train is to start, but he can be sure not to miss it when it does start. The devil take the hindmost."

In this last series of episodes Britain showed her "priority" in the East, not in Lord Elgin's way by being the most insistent in pressing her demands, but in being the last to make them. Wei-hai-Wei was leased to Britain for as long as Russia held Port Arthur, and a large tract of new territory was secured behind Kowloon. The purpose of both leases was the same. Von Bülow exactly describes it: if there was to be a partition of China, the balance of power which was keeping a doubtful peace in Europe would be imperilled, unless all the powers were well enough established in the train not to be left behind when it started.

It is well to remember that these leases, though granted to Britain by the Manchu government without much show of opposition, were not and are not popular with the Chinese people. One instance will

[1] C. L. Hsia, *Studies in Chinese Diplomatic History*, p. 76.

suffice. In the Convention of Peking (1898) civil jurisdiction over the city of Kowloon was reserved to the Chinese officials, but two days before the British flag was to be hoisted the inhabitants rose to resist the cession of their homes. The rising was quelled by British police and military, and on May 16th, as punishment for the rising, Chinese jurisdiction was expelled from the city.

But the break-up of the Chinese Empire was to come from within and not from without. In 1911 the Manchu dynasty finally failed, as it was bound in time to fail, to suppress a rising against it. The rebels were aided in this instance by young idealist republicans. The Chinese Republic came into being almost by accident. Its significance for China will be discussed later. It has had, however, a marked influence already on China's foreign relations.

Since the inception of the Republic the idea of partitioning China has been tacitly dropped in the journals and speeches of Western experts. And the abandonment of this idea has been made permanent by the Great War, and the change the war has brought about alike in public opinion and in the balance of power in the West.

That is the past, then, upon which our present is built: a long story of mutual trade, accompanied by a large measure of mutual service and respect, even in many cases of genuine friendship and trust —but, running through the whole piece, an equally long story of forceful measures on both sides. China has been struggling to resist her vigorous com-

mercial invaders, fearing that their greater vigour would drain her strength, as a piece of new cloth taketh from the old, fearing above all that her sovereignty would be impaired. Britain and her companion Western Powers have been driven on by the restless hunger for new markets, and for new opportunities for the surplus of men and money and material created by the industrialization of their peoples.

There is about it all something of the grimness of Greek drama. Necessity—in this case the cruel necessity of a great industrial machine—drives the West on to demand more and more from reluctant China. That the West is a willing victim of this Necessity makes the tragedy more tragic. What the West seeks is trade. What China wants is trade. But as it is within her borders, China wants it in her own way, in her own time, under her own political control. But the Necessity-driven West cannot wait. Uninterrupted trade depends, as Palmerston told Napier, on conciliation. But the West has never been able to wait on conciliation. Trade has therefore been extended by the use of force, and the legacy of bitterness and suspicion left behind is threatening now to ruin the trade which has been bought at that price.

And Necessity has been at work in China. She has allowed another kindred people—the Manchus—to govern her for centuries. She suffers to-day the inevitable fate of that permission. The weakness that must result alike in governors and governed

has for the last hundred and fifty years been slowly working itself out in corruption and decay in the ranks of the Manchus and their Chinese civil service, and in growing restlessness and irritation on the part of the Chinese people as a whole. The Chinese people to-day are faced with the task of winning through from what has been a form of servitude to the strength of will and character and organization which is the life of a free people, not as we did in the past in the comparative isolation of our own country, but in the midst of a world grown small and cramped, and with foreigners, who wield immense influence in material things and in political and social ideas, planted in strong community groups in many of her ports and in many vital centres inland. Small wonder then that there is friction in this delicate and difficult situation; small wonder that interests, which are at bottom one, appear at every surface point to conflict, and that the Chinese cry of imperialism and exploitation is answered by scornful denunciation of corruption and inefficiency.

CHAPTER III

CHINA

"Mr Hall will never understand China because he believes what his Chinese friends tell him. He has not learned yet that no Chinese is capable of speaking the truth. . . ." "Not in five hundred years! The Oriental is incapable of speaking the truth. He always has been. I have been brought up on the Bible, Mr Hall, and I know." Those remarks were made by men who had every reason to know what they were saying. Moreover, they were Christian men to whom Christianity was more than a convention, or even a practice, but plainly a vital spring in their own lives.

It is not possible to disregard this very prevalent accusation which is laid at the door of the Chinese people, but it may be very misleading in any endeavour to understand Chinese character to begin by looking for characteristics which we consider to be very specially our own. Even a parent who judges the excellence of his son in terms of likeness to himself is not likely to make a good estimate; how much less one man of another, and one nation of another. Moreover, it is on the face of it incredible that a "mendacious people" (the phrase is Mr Rodney Gilbert's) should have maintained for so long

a period a stable civilization. Even thieves must have a cement of "honour" if they are to remain banded together. How much more a great people in a vast continent where communications are unusually slow!

George Wingrove Cooke, correspondent of *The Times* from 1857–8, has some very relevant things to say of those who endeavour to portray the Chinese character:

> I have in these letters introduced no elaborate essay upon Chinese character. It is a great omission. No theme could be more tempting, no subject could afford wider scope for ingenious hypothesis, profound generalization and triumphant dogmatism. The truth is . . . they were always saying something or doing something which rubbed so rudely against my hypothesis, that in the interest of truth I burnt several successive letters. I may add that I have often talked this over with the most eminent and candid sinologues, and have always found them ready to agree with me as to the impossibility of a Western mind forming a conception of Chinese character as a whole. These difficulties occur, however, only to those who know the Chinese practically; a smart writer, entirely ignorant of the subject, might readily strike off a brilliant and antithetical analysis, which should leave nothing to be desired but Truth.[1]

It would perhaps have been of great advantage not only to truth but to China if many subsequent writers had accepted this dictum. The facts on which it is based partly explain the strange unsatisfactoriness of even classical accounts of Chinese characteristics. Foreign observers of equal acuteness, opportunity

[1] Quoted by H. F. Macnair in *Modern Chinese History*, p. 20.

and leisure, living in an English village or industrial slum, would produce for the benefit of their compatriots a list of almost identical characteristics. Human nature rather than national characteristics is generally displayed in such accounts. Chinese characteristics are, after all, human characteristics. What Mr Cooke writes of the unaccountability of Chinese character in its words and deeds is equally true of all human beings. That is why they are so absorbingly interesting alike to God and man.

Is it not rather true that nations differ not so much in characteristics as in the mood and temper and atmosphere of their thought and conduct? It is this background to character, this fundamental attitude to life, that must be rightly estimated if we are to know in any understanding way the people with whom our own people are in such close contact in the Far East. Not a "brilliant or antithetical" writer, but certainly "entirely ignorant of the subject," I will take Mr Cooke's warning and not attempt to describe Chinese characteristics. I will, however, endeavour to do what is much more important—suggest the root and origin and something of the meaning of those differences from ourselves which we so readily observe in Chinese people.

It is the fashion to describe the civilization of China as static and the civilization of the West as dynamic. Fortunately modern science has shown that the difference between static and dynamic is only a difference in method of motion, or in mode of energy. There is as much activity in a mountain

as in a waterfall. Only in that modern sense is it true that China's civilization is static, whereas western civilization is dynamic. Sir John Davis, the first Governor of Hong-Kong, writes, "The Chinese frequently get the better of Europeans in a discussion by imperturbable coolness and gravity." The "static" Chinese are there pitted against the "dynamic" Europeans and show themselves the more powerful of the two, and that means the more dynamic. Both are determined on certain ends. The difference is in the method. The apparently static method wins.

But is there a more profound difference between the Chinese and British people than difference in method? May there not be a radical difference in attitude to life?

Two experiences stand out—experiences in China. But they are more than experiences in China, they are essentially experiences of China, experiences which seem by their emotional accompaniment to pass one over from knowing about China to that different kind of knowledge—knowing China as a friend. The first experience was at Moukden at the tombs of the first emperors of the Manchu dynasty. Built in the north whence these great conquerors had come, they are in the architectural style of the people they had conquered—a parable in itself of China's power to absorb her conquerors. They are isolated in a delightful pine wood on rising ground some miles outside the city. This isolated setting makes much easier a vivid and distinct impression

of the conception of the whole architectural plan; and an afternoon of sun and sailing clouds, of wheeling birds and wine-keen air, added to the general perfection of the setting. The outer court consists of a rectangular park enclosed by a high wall: a great southern gateway with accompanying pavilions: vestries where, in the old imperial days, processions robed and mustered: a wide avenue leading to another gateway in an inner tomb: side entrances on east and north, with drives leading to the main avenue. The inner court is walled and turreted at each corner with a pavilioned tower; within it are more pavilions and the great central hall where the stone monument rests on a turtle's back. Finally, behind it all a dragon screen and an immense artificial hill made one with the forest. Every pavilion is a riot of colour—red pillars, red beams, green and gold and blue in wanton splendour on the eaves and ceilings, every roof a glory of tawny and yellow tiles.

Standing in the midst of this simple and yet rich beauty, with its perfection of line and colouring, there came to one an almost bewildering sense of the significance of its amazing proportion. There is proportion, of course, in all architecture and in all art, but the effect is often something to which the proportion is subordinate. There is a massive sense of wonder about Durham Cathedral—a sense which is heightened but not caused by the majesty of its proportion. But here there was no wonder, except wonder at the proportion, the harmony, and the so

perfect spacing of every building, every pillar, every distance.

What can be the secret of the genius which makes great architects produce such perfect harmony? What is the inner force of a civilization which expresses its religious feeling in this way? Why, as a tomb for the great dead, this perfect expression of the harmonious satisfactoriness of life? There was no aspiration about it—no tower or minaret piercing up into the unknown: nothing but plain rectangular buildings and sloping roofs, nothing but the perfect contentedness of pure symmetry. There was no gathering up of the whole in one dominating point as in a Gothic spire. Everything led up to the central pavilion, but was not joined to it or dominated by it. Each part was complete in itself. The harmony was achieved by that completeness and by the perfect concordance of each part with the rest.

Here then is something new to us—something which cannot be judged by western standards. It is an expression of fundamental life ideas so different from anything we have experienced that we can only describe it, we cannot compare it. The word that most nearly describes it is harmony. The driving life force which finds expression in such building must count as its great ideal a corporate life of perfectly balanced relations. Perhaps it is this spirit that men have felt in China and have misnamed conservatism. When they say that, they mean by conservatism the spirit which trusts the past because it has been tried. But this spirit which is traditional

in China is not conservatism of that kind. It does not trust the past. It trusts the ideal of the past; trusts it not because it has been tried but for what it is in itself, a positive creative thing, the ideal of harmony.

At the very heart centre then of Chinese civilization there must be a category of thought and feeling, a mode of life expression which is very different from our own. We can only understand it if we experience its value and its meaning for life as a whole. It is not enough to admire Chinese art; we must understand its significance as an expression of life experience.

The second experience of China came a month later at Chufou, the temple and the burial place of Confucius. The temple of Confucius is in its main idea similar to the tombs of the northern emperors, but much more elaborate. Court after court, pavilion after pavilion, paved square after paved square, till one is stifled almost, and sighs for fresh air and open fields and life less intricate, less connected up, than this. Then slowly the meaning of it all—some of the meaning of it all—steals in upon bewilderment. Here is the home become a cathedral. Here is the Chinese home with its courts arranged for children and children's children, and beyond for retainers and their children and their children's children. But it is more than a home. The home has been canonized. It has been made the vehicle of worship.

I do not know whether this is borne out by the

history of temple architecture. I am sure it must be the feeling which made great temple architects. For behind architecture of this kind there must be a life force, a feeling after expression, an experience of something profound in life. And this feeling expressed in architecture must, in its turn, have an influence on life. Paris on Sunday afternoons goes to Versailles. Visitors to London stand at the gates of Buckingham Palace in subdued awe. But Versailles is not Notre Dame. There is no sense of religious value about it: only the marvel of human achievement and the terrible tragedy of human failure. And Buckingham Palace is not Westminster Abbey. Far off, one hopes for a glimpse of the King, but one has no thought there of God or of the solemn mystery of the unseen that is writ so plain in parts of Westminster. What we have separated, China has united. Not entirely, of course: there is the Altar and the Temple of Heaven where the style of architecture has little connection with the domestic; and there may be other examples of the same thing. But on the whole, whereas our churches are places of assembly become halls of corporate worship, in China the temple is a home canonized. Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, have all felt the impression of this fundamental idea. In the buildings of all three religious groups it works itself out to a greater or less extent. Even the form of worship is of this kind. It consists in individual visits as to a home rather than in an assembling together of the community in a place of meeting.

This impression was supplemented and deepened, carried on from the home to the family, when one walked from the temple through the city and out along the avenue of trees so old that two in every three were almost leafless. In the open air at last, and the open fields, we went to the great walled park which is the burial place of the Kung family, the descendants of Confucius (Kung Fu Tze). In the heart of it is the burial place of Confucius himself. Round about him in the great park in various stages of proximity are buried innumerable descendants. Memorial tablets, if not the actual remains, of his immediate ancestors are beside him. At the end of paths which turn three times to the left for a few yards each time, lest they should appear too grand and formal for the simple tomb of the sage, is a plain stone slab, in front of a small conical mound, half hidden in the park scrub. Four golden characters are engraved upon it: "Perfect Fulfiller, Master Teacher." As I bowed three times in Chinese style in gratitude alike to God and man for what this master man has meant to men, the sense of the religious meaning of it all was overwhelming. Here is expressed a warmth of feeling which breathes life into the family ethic, an ethic which before, as I had read about it, had seemed so cold, precise and terribly self-righteous.

Still in the district lives the seventy-eighth descendant of the sage. He is a lad of six. His father, so the local gossip goes, only just succeeded in begetting him; there was consternation as to what

would happen when at last the third concubine produced a son. That fact is another example of the fundamental difference between our two civilizations. Here is the apotheosis of the family. Marriage is secondary. It is the family that matters. Monogamy against polygamy has not been an issue in the past. The continuance of the family has been the sole issue. The feelings and rights of men and women have been subordinated to the family. Subordinated? Have we any right to use the word? This is a system so different from our own that we cannot use our standards of judgment for it. Incidentally there are in this reverence for the family points of similarity with some aspects of evolutionary ethics.

Two things then stand out as fundamental in Chinese life. They are harmony and family life. Reduced to such bare simplicity they appear universal. The writings of most teachers of the world emphasize their importance. The difference between peoples seems to be not so much in the ideals their great men have set before them but in some more fundamental feeling and thought forms which give a certain emphasis and general direction to their attempts to realize their ideals.

To understand the character of the Chinese then, it is not enough to quote their sages or their proverbs. Far less is it enough to quote the experience of foreigners in dealings with them. It is necessary, in the first place, to accept the inherence in the idea of harmony, as they feel it, of a value different from

the value we give to it. This ideal may perhaps be described as harmony in action. It is more than harmonious action. The harmony is the important aspect, action rather an inevitable accompaniment. And, in the second place, it must be realized that the religious expression of this fundamental idea is connected primarily with the home and with the family and not, as with us, with the community or with the individual. The appalling rectitude of George Washington's boyhood has, for those who admire it, an immense value. It shows the strength of individual rectitude. To the Chinese mind individual rectitude is unimportant except as a bond in family life. Rigid adherence to the truth is secondary to filial piety. It is the family rather than the individual that is sacred. Breaches of filial piety are the only acts which are accompanied by anything approaching our sense of sin. Here is something so fundamentally different from our own standards that we cannot appraise its value. We can only say that these things are plainly fundamental in Chinese life and thought. In all our contacts with Chinese people we must bear them in mind.

If we lay down truthfulness, courage, and incorruptibility as the ultimate virtues essential for public life, we can be sure that we shall find them, if we find them at all in China, against a family setting. Mr Bertrand Russell remarks in his *Problem of China* that one of China's most terrible weaknesses is the prevalence of corruption in political and official circles.

There is no ground for saying that it is any less so now, five years after his visit. And Mr Russell puts his finger on the fundamental cause of this distressing weakness—the family. In China family responsibility is a more vital and more important thing than political honour. China puts the family above the state; we put the state above the family. Social legislation in recent years has been endeavouring to fill the gap caused with us by this exaltation of the state. In China health insurance, old age pensions, and to a large extent educational expenses, are borne by the family. Plainly there are serious weaknesses in both systems. China at least is conscious of the weaknesses in her system, and is endeavouring to adjust the balance without losing her sense of the sacredness of the family, and of all that it means in her national life.

Chinese courage also is different from ours. This difference is admirably analysed by Mr Meadows:

> It is both true and false to say that the Chinese people possess a high degree of fortitude. It is true in so far as fortitude signifies that quality of the mind which enables a man to bear pain or adversity without murmuring, depression, or despondency; and false in so far as it means that quality which enables him to meet danger with readiness and courage . . . any unavoidable evil they regard full in the face . . . almost with a degree of cheerfulness.[1]

For this he gives two reasons:

> Of that courage which is based on a determination of the mind to display intrepidity, they are

[1] Thomas Taylor Meadows, *Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China*, 1847, p. 199.

> nationally wanting, simply because their own opinions and institutions offer little inducement to their minds to come to any such determination.[1]

And

> Every man is induced to learn himself, and to infuse anxiously into the minds of his children . . . a set of doctrines, all inculcating the duty of patient endurance, the necessity of subordination, and the beauty of a quiet, orderly life.[2]

"Opinions," "institutions," and "education" are all against the development of that type of intrepidity which we understand. The Chinese are not interested in "displaying" courage, but in "orderly life." Their courage then has its roots deep down in their fundamental feeling after harmony. Their courage must be understood against the background of the idea of social life by which their minds are dominated.

China is a land where disputes are settled by mediators—as far as disputes can be settled by any one but the disputants themselves. Because we have not China's background we settle our disputes either by a display of courage in some form, or by accepting the decision of a court of law. China has a way of doing it over a cup of tea. This method is more likely to win the consent of the disputants to the terms of settlement. In the same way, in political or municipal disputes or in the reform of abuses, the method employed is profoundly different from ours. We have a picture of ourselves being courageous, of making a stand, and so compelling others to put

[1] Thomas Taylor Meadows, *Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China*, 1847, p. 200.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

our plan into action. A Chinese naturally thinks rather of an organic complex of human wills, and how he can secure an acceptance of any new idea or proposal without breaking the existing harmony.

I was told recently of an incident in the interior of Fukien Province which makes this point very clear. A missionary, beloved by the Chinese for miles round, who has lived in the district for many years and has become almost Chinese in his own outlook, received, in the course of a controversy, an impossible letter. Only one course seemed open to him. He wrote what he considered to be a polite and moderate ultimatum. Fortunately he showed it to his colleague, an old Chinese pastor. His brief comment was, " You cannot send that letter; it will break off relations." The missionary replied, " Yes, I know, but that is about where we have got to. What else can I do ? " There was an equally brief rejoinder, " He is your neighbour. You have got to go on living beside him." The Chinese mind immediately thought in terms of neighbourhood relations rather than of a purely individual issue.

Again and again one is asked, " Why do not the decent, honest, patriotic Chinese come out and make a stand ? " The reason is that they do not think in terms of " making a stand," but of something beyond that typically western, puritan, protestant, but not necessarily Christian way of getting things done. In China time does not matter. Harmony, and all the values that underlie harmony in social life, matter enormously. Commander Stephen King-Hall

suggests, in his shrewd and discerning book, *Western Civilization and the Far East*, that this temper of mind, however excellently suited to Chinese local requirements, is sadly at fault from an international point of view. The desperate need at the present time for an international mind among the nations of the world which will put the harmony of the whole before individual " rights " bears against this view. It suggests rather that this Chinese temper is just what is most needed in the international sphere to-day. That it has appeared to fail China in the past may be the fault of the " dynamic " West. To suffer at the hands of an opponent does not necessarily mean failure, nor does the apparent success and prosperity of the West necessarily mean success. We may still have something to learn from the Chinese temper if we are to save our own civilization from self-destruction.

There is another aspect of this mind-temper that is worth a moment's consideration in further illustration of its method and force. This aspect is what lies behind all that is meant by " face " in China. The episode in the Fukien village is one example of the natural instinct in the Chinese mind to recognize that the result of a man's action upon a neighbour's feelings is important. To Westerners in contact with Chinese this is a continual source of embarrassment and annoyance. Face has, of course, a bad side. It is very close to hypocrisy and deceit. But as a temper of mind it has considerable value in everyday relations because of its sensitiveness to

the personalities of others. It is evidence of a feeling that any human personality should not be so ruthlessly handled as to destroy self-respect.

There has been so much of surface change in China in recent years that "changing China" has become a much more common conception than the old conception of the "changeless East." Undoubtedly China has borrowed many of our more comfortable ways of doing things. Modern scientific and mechanical aids to living, railways, and industrial enterprise are making their mark. Even the citadel of the old patriarchal family is being attacked. The small family habit of the West is steadily becoming the rule in certain sections of Chinese life. But the unchanging something in every civilization, the attitude to life, or mind-temper, whatever it should be called, which is the driving force that makes any civilization a distinct civilization at all, is still deep-rooted in Chinese life. The old organization of the family may disappear; but the conception of the value and meaning of family life remains. Continual fighting and civil wars in China are partly due to the fact that the Chinese are by nature not "one-way men." They are too ready perhaps to make peace where peace is impossible; they prefer harmony to ruthlessness. They will not as a rule fight to a finish; fighting therefore keeps breaking out.

The great value of Spengler's monumental work, *The Decline of the West*, is that the author shows convincingly that a civilization is the co-operative work of minds who have, as it were intuitively, the same

view of the universe. The distinctiveness of China as a force in the world's life lies in this intuitive mind-temper. If there were any sign of this mind-temper decaying or losing its hold on her, then it would be necessary to regard China as a dying civilization. But there is no such sign. Dr Spengler will probably not find such universal acceptance of his contention that every culture has its periods and seasons from spring through summer and autumn to winter, and that there can be no real creative development after the winter phase has been reached. To the Sung philosophers of China, however, winter is not the season of decay and death, but of "potentiality." Chinese culture has certainly been in the barren period of winter for some centuries. But the Chinese conception of winter is truer than Dr Spengler's. It is a period of potentiality—its decay is external only. In China the force which made the great civilization of the past may be frost-bound and frozen in winter's grip. But it is still there, a fount of immense possibilities. That vital force is to-day, as it has always been, the fundamental China.

CHAPTER IV

BRITAIN

Dr Aggrey has a delightful argument in support of his belief in the Negro Race, and of his gratification at being black rather than white: the past of the White Races, he maintains, is behind them; the past of the Negro Race is still in the future. This may be true in a different way of China. We are accustomed to think of her as so immeasurably older than ourselves. We seem to be still in our teens, while she is in her dotage. But it may be truer that China is nearing a new spring, while we are slipping from summer into autumn. In the mobilization of our material resources we have reached a stage in which rapid change or development is unlikely. China has all those forces undeveloped. It is likely that she will not develop them along our lines, but development and change are inevitable in China, and with us relatively unlikely. In that sense, therefore, we should perhaps consider China a comparatively young, and Britain a comparatively old, country.

This aspect of our life as a nation, this relative elderliness, is of the first importance in an endeavour to estimate our total influence as a nation on the world's life to-day, particularly as it affects our relations with China in the coming generation.

To use Dr Spengler's analogy, if the period inaugurated by the vitality of the Elizabethan age was the spring of our national life, the florid brilliance of the Victorian age may well have been summer. To-day we stand, perhaps, on the threshold of autumn—the period of harvesting, of ingathering, of storing the results of our labours. In a sense this can be the best period of all, and in national life there is no reason why it should not be indefinitely prolonged. But if it is true that we are, relatively, in September, we must beware of a May-mentality—of living in September as if next month were to be June and not October. Without pressing a fanciful metaphor too far, there is at any rate an element of the autumnal in our present situation in the world. If we are to estimate aright the influence of what we are in ourselves upon the problems we have to face, we must not forget the influence upon both of what is, perhaps, an early autumn season, at any rate as far as geographical expansion is concerned.

The international recreation ground of Shanghai is at the west end of the Nanking Road; so is the Louza police station. You would expect British folk to be on the recreation ground on a Saturday afternoon; you would not expect Chinese students to be demonstrating outside the police station. But it was no accident that this should have been so on Saturday, May 30th, 1925.

Students had been arrested for demonstrating in protest against the ill-treatment of a Chinese labourer

by a Japanese foreman—the labourer had died after a beating, whether because of it or not no one can ever know; each side has its own belief about it. At the request of the Japanese Assessor at the Mixed Court, these students had been remanded, a procedure which in China has often an ugly meaning. When the news of this reached the colleges, students assembled on their playing-fields and marched to the police station, where an angry mob gathered round them. A few years before, the police station had been broken into by a mob. The police could not afford to let this happen again. Shooting orders were finally given. Several students and some onlookers were killed.

This ghastly encounter—which as a symbol and a turning-point means in China what Amritsar means in India—was no accident and no one's fault. The settlement, or some would say the non-settlement, of all the issues it raised in China has been very curiously mishandled, and much time and energy have been wasted in the attempt to analyse responsibility and apportion blame.

But those who demonstrated and those who urged them to demonstrate, equally with those who fired, and indeed with those responsible for the system which made the firing inevitable, are not culprits: they are tools, puppets, pawns in a much greater game—the whole conflict between white commercial expansion and the political rejuvenation of the great Eastern races and cultures. In this whole conflict Britain is bound up with all the other typically

Western Powers ("typically" Western, because Japan is included; having accepted Western industrial civilization, Japan also finds herself driven on to the same form of commercial expansion). Only one of the many who are in this conflict, Britain, because of the peculiar outlook and temper of her people, has inevitably a peculiar place in it.

The British folk were on the recreation ground. That is where you would expect them to be on a hot Saturday afternoon. The recreation ground in Shanghai is like a great Public School playing-field: the cricket pitch in the centre dominated by a large pavilion, other cricket games going on on every side, and tennis courts occupying the odd corners. The base-ball match between Japanese and Americans which you can watch from the back windows of the pavilion, the polo going on in the middle distance, even the quiet assiduity of the Chinese waiters in bringing you hot teacake, cannot destroy the illusion that you are back in England, and what is more, back in the light-hearted irresponsible days of school and college, when games were the only really serious business of life. It was characteristic of these grown men from Britain that they should be spending their Saturday afternoon in this earnest playing. It was equally characteristic of those Chinese boys that they should be demonstrating with a much more desperate earnestness outside the police station. No wonder these grown men with their healthy boyish absorption in the serious business of cricket should not understand the boys who

such a short distance away were absorbed by a political passion more intense than that of most grown men.

The difference is more than a difference in character; it includes a very profound difference in "attitude to life." That the difference between civilizations is due to some such fundamental life-attitude has already been suggested. An understanding of China or of Britain depends more on an understanding and appreciation of this fundamental mind-set than on any other one thing. Unfortunately it seems difficult for China or for Britain to appreciate an attitude fundamentally different from her own. China, for instance, does literally regard the strenuous athleticism of the Shanghai recreation ground, and the whole rough-and-ready code of manners and methods which goes with it, as childish, if not animal or barbarous.

This Chinese attitude is not expressed as it was in early days, when the phrase and idea of barbarism were universal. There is, on the contrary, a wide recognition of the value of recreation, and a determination to adopt from the West at least a measure of her athleticism. But the fundamental difference in outlook is not affected by this recognition. Young Chinese men of culture and affairs do not in fact spend a quarter as much time on strenuous athleticism as their British contemporaries. Many, of course, at the present time waste as much in night-clubs, but they can for the moment be "paired" with their British equivalents. Public-spirited men of

affairs in China, whether in commerce or politics or literature, do not spend the amount of time or of thought or of money on recreation that we do. It is very rarely a subject of ordinary conversation. This can be partly explained by the vast amount of work that there is to be done in China which only Chinese can do. But I believe the reason goes much deeper.

I have attempted to suggest some aspects of the fundamental life conception or thought mood which makes the atmosphere of China's thought and practice. What is ours? We may expect it to be the same intuitive view of the universe that made our ancestors the clean-living, hard-drinking folk they were; the same view that made the age of chivalry, that made Robin Hood and his merry men, that made London apprentices cheery hooligans and honest craftsmen, and our Drakes and Blakes and Nelsons loyal dare-devil heroes. There is a boyish zest for life in them all, and an equally boyish enjoyment and skill in controlling other people.

The place that is occupied in Chinese culture by the feeling after harmony is probably taken in our national life by this joy in achievement. Our love of sport is plainly connected with it. It leads golfers to garrulity and fishermen very near mendacity. Perhaps the real parallel in our life to the Chinese family is that peculiarly British invention—the team. In China the large family has provided a group unit. In Britain we frequently have to make it. We run schools on the house system, and on the principle of

esprit de corps for the school itself. Although the existence in German university life of the Student Corps, and our use of the French term *esprit de corps* to express the team spirit, suggest that the fundamental idea underlying team games is shared with the other national groups of our corner of Europe, we can fairly claim team games themselves, and all the life values which they express and achieve, as Britain's most characteristic contribution to the life of the world at the present time. Other nations are copying our games, even our team games, and beating us at them. In 1925 a team of Japanese boys from Keio University in Tokyo played the Shanghai Rugby football team, including British international caps. Shanghai won on points, but the moral victory was with the Japanese—and the reason was not only individual skill but team skill. Other nations may copy and develop the team athleticism which we have invented, but the invention at any rate remains our own. And we are inclined to believe, though here we are not the best judges, that even where our games have been copied, the British spirit of sport has not always followed—that spirit which puts the game before victory and enjoys defeat if it is hardly won.

This team conception is, like our love of sport, related to the fundamental idea of achievement. The desire for achievement is transferred from the individual to the group, the individual sharing, of course, in the achievement, but subordinating his own success strictly to the success of the group.

This accounts for the exclusive spirit which the group seems inevitably to acquire, as well as for the remarkable success of team work. A school side can generally beat a better club side, and is more likely to beat a still better scratch side.

Whether or not the spirit of fair play, which we consider to be one of our outstanding characteristics, is the result or the cause of team playing, it is very definitely related to the whole conception of the team, and is certainly strengthened and developed by team playing. Its roots must lie very near to those of the dominant idea behind our national character. A society based on the idea of individual achievement would result in chaos if it was not held in check by some sort of recognition of the claims of others. It is this recognition that gives to the conception of law which we have inherited from the Romans that personal note which is so distinctively the characteristic of British justice. But this type of recognition of others is different in origin from the recognition of the claims of society which is the dominant note in Chinese life. It is based on the individual. It moves from the individual to the group. It is buttressed not by the strength of tradition or by the economic pressure of a joint family system, but by personal pride, or, as we prefer to call it, personal honour. A thing is "not done" in England. It is not done because the individual wants society to regard him as a certain kind of person, the kind of person who would not do that kind of thing. In the case of the best and strongest characters, this desire to be a certain

kind of person is quite independent of society. "I don't care what anybody says" is with some people literally true. But whether the standard by which a man lives is one which he has set for himself, or one which society sets for him, the root motive of action in each life is the same—the desire to achieve a certain standard.

If the strong sense of desire and will to achieve is the source of the strength of our national culture, the inevitable accompaniment of that desire—the sense of Self as achieving, or of Self as having achieved—is its central weakness. This was very remarkable to outside observers during the progress of the prolonged mining dispute, and, of course, still more remarkable during the few tense days of the General Strike. The nation kept cool because it was obsessed by the idea that British people do keep cool, and, still more, perhaps, because of a blind unreasoning confidence in ourselves and in our country. We said in effect to one another, "We have weathered storms in the past. We have always muddled through. It is our way of doing things. There is no need to worry." This had its place during the actual crisis. But the fairly general continuance of that state of mind was most dangerous. We were too much obsessed with the idea that we are a people who achieve, and tended to rest on the oars of our past achievement. We went to Ascot and the cinema while the mining industry went to the dogs.

This rather dangerous self-confidence is not the

only accompaniment of our sense of honour and of pride in ourselves. Another result of it is that we are essentially an exclusive people. Foreign students coming from India remark continually on the change they notice on reaching London. Travelling through Italy and France *en route*, they notice that Frenchmen and Italians, seeing a man sitting alone at a table, invariably join him. The Englishman will always search first for an empty table, and, if he cannot find one, will barricade himself with his newspaper. A good story has been going the rounds of the Anglo-American communities in China. An American missionary, returning via India to China, and travelling from Rangoon to Singapore on an English boat, found himself the only non-British passenger. Singling out the most approachable Englishman he could find, he attacked him with outstretched hand, and "Ritter's my name." There was a moment's silence, and then, with the friendliest finality, "Splendid."

That is exactly what every one of us would feel under like circumstances, and what we would do if we had the courage; and it is exactly what our American cousins expect us to feel and do. And, of course, it is no use trying to be what we are not.

We cannot be what we are not. But it is of vital importance that we should realize the full effect upon others of what we are. And this is especially true if we are to understand what effect we make as a people upon the people of China. There is in this exclusive tendency of ours much which we consider to

be wholly admirable. We attribute to it the respect which we believe we still enjoy from the world as a whole. It may even have helped us to do our work in the world under the conditions of the last generation. But what is its effect going to be, in this and the next generation, upon ourselves and upon other people? For exclusiveness carries its own penalties with it. We may believe that we are able to administer justice impartially to those for whose wellbeing we are responsible if we keep ourselves apart from them. But it is becoming increasingly doubtful whether that really is the case. It is the head master who keeps himself in touch with his boys, and really knows what is going on in their minds, who is able to deal most justly and creatively with offenders. He is informed what a boy has done. But he himself knows from his close contact with the temper and moods of his school why the boy did it. Nothing is more serious in China to-day than the ignorance even of responsible Englishmen of what is really moving in the minds of those with whom they have to do in everyday life. The police know something about it, and the press knows something else. The ideas of those Chinese whose main interest is the immediate development of their own businesses are also easily picked up. What an event which goes deeper, as for instance, the Nanking Road shooting, means in terms of *feeling* to the Chinese, whose fellow-countrymen were killed by the orders of foreigners, we are for the most part totally unable to understand.

I was present, shortly after the Wansien incident, at an English service in a Treaty Port at which the relatives of the British naval men who had been killed were commended to the love of God. There was no mention made of the Chinese who had been killed, or of their relatives. The omission was, I am sure, quite unconscious, almost innocent. It was not caused by national feeling or by any judgment on the deserts of the case. But there cannot have been any real conscious appreciation of how the world must seem to the world Father who was addressed, to whom the Chinese and their suffering matter as much as the British and their suffering. Nor can there be in the life of the community, of which that was a typical expression, real consciousness of the feeling and emotions of the people in whose midst they are living.

We have acquired an insularity of mind which seems to increase in insularity in inverse ratio to our distance from our insular base. It is quite unconscious. It is difficult to describe it as a moral failing. There is about it more of that necessity which makes the tragedy of the Greek drama so irresistible than of the moral failure or weakness which is the ever-recurring theme of lesser tragedy. In spite of *Dear Brutus*, the fault is rather in our stars than in ourselves that we are insular. It is part of the heritage of the past, which has become intertwined with our whole social background.

But to say that there is a large measure of inevitability in our insularity is not to say that we must

lie down under it. Kismet may be the philosophy of the Middle East, but our philosophy is achievement. We must use our sense of achievement to get us out of the rut in which past achievement has left us. For this unconscious insularity of mind tends to impair what we must regard as our greatest achievement. Our insular-mindedness is impairing our sense of justice. Perhaps it is impossible to be at the same time insular and fair-minded. Mr Gladstone's denunciation of our first war with China in 1840 and his "uneasiness" about our national action at that time suggest that this is not a new development, but has always been an insidious danger accompanying our international dealings. But the change that has taken place in the last two decades in the relation of the peoples of the world to one another has made this weakness in our world outlook more apparent and more serious. It is an outlook more dangerous in early autumn than in the spring or summer of a nation's life.

Our insular-mindedness is more likely to impair our sense of justice now than in the early days of the modern era. Except within the limits of the Commonwealth we are no longer expanding. The man whose business is expanding is likely to be much more generous in mind and hand than the man who is struggling to maintain a business of long standing in the position it has enjoyed in the past. It does not matter to the man whose business is expanding if a few people malign him. He can answer them best by ignoring them and going ahead. But the

man whose business is not expanding cannot ignore such attacks. He is on the defensive. He dare not make an enemy or lose a customer. His psychology is the psychology of one who must justify himself. He may even become more concerned about the preservation of the good name of his firm than about the promotion of his business and the service of his customers. That analogy is as bad as any other. We would indeed be in a bad way if that were true in all its details of our country. But there is enough of that situation in our position in the Far East to-day to justify the comparison and make it worth considering. As a nation we are on the defensive. We are endeavouring to maintain a position. And that attitude does make us unduly sensitive. It brings into any questions that come up between us and other countries an element of deep feeling. We feel that if others speak ill of us, we at least must never allow that we were wrong; we must explain and defend and justify. In the old days we did not waste time on that sort of thing. Our business was a flourishing concern. We were not so easily hurt.

It is this instinct to defend ourselves which makes our national insularity of mind so dangerous at the present time — dangerous because it reduces our ability to see the point of view of another people. For instance, in the events that followed the May 30th shooting, we feel that national feeling played perhaps an undue part in the average Chinese attitude towards it. But we forget that the impression we made on the minds

of the average intelligent Chinese was that we were endeavouring all the time to justify what had been done by our nationals, rather than to discover the truth. The final action, after the police officers concerned had been acquitted of blame by the majority of the court (they were allowed to resign), gave the impression that we could not even be just to our own people. Altogether, amongst thinking Chinese it was a serious blow to our reputation for fair play. No suggestion is intended that any but the best course under the circumstances was taken. Only those in possession of all the facts can really hold any opinion on a case so complicated and so strangely handled throughout. But a fact of tremendous importance for our present purpose is that the confusion that resulted in the handling of the case appeared to be due to this defensive psychology.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this defensive attitude is increasingly permeating the atmosphere of our thought and action, as other people gradually begin to share with us the position of pre-eminence and priority which has for so long been our monopoly.

That this is so, that this defensive psychology is making us increasingly unable to appreciate the other man's point of view, will be made clear by two further illustrations. Listening to a sermon in China on the subject of "Bearing one another's burdens," I waited eagerly for some suggestion as to sympathy with the people among whom we were living. It was inevitable that mention should be made of May 30th.

I cheered inwardly, expecting some reference to what that had meant to the Chinese. Instead—"If the Chinese had understood, or had made any attempt to understand, our position, how different the whole trend of events would have been!" That was all. Not even the brief "and vice versa" which to the last I had expected; for, after all, the text was "Bear ye one another's burdens." The white man's burden is laid down indeed. In the past we might not have attempted to understand the other man's point of view, but at least we did not complain because he would not understand ours.

The second incident was a newspaper controversy over the management of the Waterworks in the Chinese district of Chapei, adjoining Shanghai. A leading article in the British press had used the case of the Chapei Waterworks as a text for what was in effect a sermon violently denouncing the corruption and incompetence of Chinese officialdom. This is typical of much of the writing in the British press in China. The fact that a great deal of it is justified is not at the moment to the point. What matters is the root reason for this common pastime. I believe it to be fundamentally this same disease of "defensiveitis." The more the incompetence of Chinese local government can be demonstrated, the more clearly is the case made for maintaining our present privileges. On this occasion a Chinese wrote to the paper protesting against remarks which included China in general in the condemnation of the Waterworks' management. He made no attempt to

prove that the Waterworks were not at fault, or to deny that China in general was very largely at fault. The protest was against wholesale condemnation on an issue which did not affect China as a whole. Opinion of the controversy divided on racial lines. As an Englishman of exceptional fair-mindedness and unusual sympathy for the Chinese summed it up, "Well, a fellow who can defend the Chapei Waterworks must be the last word." Plainly even in his mind the real issue was entirely confused. The injustice apparent to the Chinese could not be understood by the Englishman whose mind was more or less tinged with this defensive psychology. This is an unconscious influence, which makes it all the more insidious.

I have no desire in any of these controversial issues to take the Chinese side against my own countrymen. I am only endeavouring to point out how serious it is for our good name that there should be any question of taking sides. It shows how deeply this defensive psychology has eaten into our minds, and how it is poisoning at the source our sense of fair play. It is further illustrated by the sensitiveness of the British in China as to what is said in Britain. In the old days we were not so sensitive to what people had to say. We got on with our job, and trusted to time and events to demonstrate the truth.

As a people, then, set over against the Chinese, we are what our fathers were, *plus* what the changed relative position which we occupy in the world is making

us. We are active people, straight-living and straight-dealing, dominated by the idea of achievement, not in the busy way which we suspect in our American cousins, but in the good old solid British way, which is still the ideal of most of us. But we are facing a new and very difficult situation. We have not got the space that our fathers had. More difficult still, our task is to maintain something that they have handed down to us, rather than to make something new for ourselves.

These two things—the fundamental world view of our people, the will to achieve, and the present confined world atmosphere in which we are living—are the things that matter in our contacts with other countries. Treaty revision, tariff conferences, press denunciations or appreciations, are all secondary. What we do as a government follows from what we are as a people. We cannot make ourselves much different from what we are. We cannot take on the thought-life of China, or of India, or of Mars. But just because we are people dominated by the joy of achieving we can, if we will, achieve even the difficult tasks of the period in our national life in which we find ourselves. We can see a new task before us, and setting ourselves to achieve it, find as much joy in it as our fathers did in theirs.

Their task at its best was to be fatherly; ours is to be brotherly, which is infinitely more difficult. For it is not even a case of being the eldest brother, an attitude comparatively easy and pleasant—for

the eldest brother. We are to become one among many brethren.

There is only one way out of our present defensive mood; we must use our *imaginations* to enable us to recognize that our business is to be brotherly. Once we recognize that and realize what it entails, the fundamental will to achieve which is our heritage will carry us on to fulfilment.

A question remains: have we enough imagination? Had we been primarily imaginative people, could we have done what we have in the way of solid achievement? Being what we are, have we the imagination necessary for the task ahead? Can we acquire it?

NOTE.

I am fully conscious of the more than usual unsatisfactoriness of this chapter. Many who are proud of other elements in the British mind-temper and of recent action taken by Britain in her relations with China may regret that no reference has been made to them.

I can only reply:

1. I believe that nationals who blow the national trumpet are dangerous to any country.

2. I have endeavoured to picture Britain, as I have endeavoured to picture China, not as she is at her best, but as she is at her average and ordinary in general temper and outlook.

3. As I am considering what is the effect of Britain's being what she is upon Sino-British relations, I have tried to emphasize those elements in the British temper which most affect our dealings with China.

R. O. H.

CHAPTER V

RELATIONS

AN elementary rule of warfare is the principle of liaison. Progress is only made by advancing in the closest touch. A platoon advancing in one field details a couple of men to move along the fence and keep in touch with the platoon in the next field. The efficiency of this liaison group is vital to both units. A great deal depends on whether or not they are good conductors. If their stupidity or negligence allows any serious resistance to the actual flow of information from one group to the other, the line will inevitably be broken and the advance probably fail.

In the relations between China and Britain there are many and varied connecting files. These have a distinct individuality of their own and must therefore be considered apart from the individuality of the two peoples. However well I know the character of two of my friends, that tells me very little about the nature and quality of the friendship that springs up between them as the result of my introduction of them to each other. That individual entity then, which is the sum of the relations of China and Britain, must be considered apart from the actual

character and influence of each country as a separate unit.

If the history of the peoples who inhabit the great land mass which divides China from the Mediterranean had been peaceful during the centuries that separate the Roman Empire from the European Renaissance, overland relations between China and Europe might have developed in a normal and comparatively peaceful manner. This part of Asia was, however, the scene of the rise and fall of some of the greatest dynasties in the world's history, and of such relentless and incessant fighting, slaying, and burning, that it is small wonder that it should now be little better than a vast desert. Had this not been so, China would never have relapsed into the exclusive isolation which made our first contacts with her by sea so difficult. To-day, the predominant factor in the relations between China and the Western powers is that at almost every Chinese port of any size some Western power is in a position of partial control of trade and its regulation. It cannot be denied that this state of affairs has been, and still is, of real value for the development of China's foreign trade and of her industries. But commercial advantage has little attraction to any people when that commercial advantage is secured at the expense of political prestige.

For Britain the question is mainly a commercial question. For China it is mainly a political question. Britain is to China one of the "Powers."

China is to Britain a "market." We have endeavoured to ensure security for trade. China's endeavour has always been to preserve intact her national sovereignty.

Before the Revolution of 1911 this was true only of official China. During both Anglo-Chinese wars, trade was continued except in the immediate area of operations. But since the Revolution this has been the case no longer. Increasingly, educated and semi-educated Chinese are coming to regard the question of relations with Britain and other countries from a political angle in the first instance, and as a commercial question only after the political question has been settled.

A delegation of Chinese business men went recently from Shanghai to Japan on a mission that was essentially commercial. The Japanese press was puzzled and indignant that this purely commercial group were perpetually bringing in the question of the Twenty-One Demands.[1] The Japanese insisted that the question of the Twenty-One Demands was entirely a political one, and should be excluded from a commercial discussion. We tend to take the same attitude. It is difficult for us to realize how vitally our commercial expansion of the last hundred years has affected China's political existence. It is difficult for us to understand why Chinese public opinion should have been so much against us in the matter of the Nanking Road shooting. But the reason for it is simple.

[1] A political ultimatum presented to China by Japan in 1915.

What is to us youthful folly threatening the security of trade, Chinese as much as British, appears inevitably to the average Chinese as ardent, if misguided, patriotism. He forgets therefore his natural condemnation of the folly in his equally natural sympathy with the patriotic motive.

The dislike of aliens, which is becoming increasingly vocal in English sentiment, is of the same nature, and should therefore help us to understand the strength of Chinese sentiment against us. British anti-alien prejudice does not depend upon whether those aliens are useful or not. It is based on an unreasoning (not necessarily unreasonable) suspicion and jealousy of foreigners, coupled with an equally unreasoning fear that they will interfere with English prosperity, or take jobs that Englishmen should have. As a matter of fact we have probably derived more benefit from alien residents than any other European country—from the crafts that the Huguenots brought with them, from the excellent work that the Dutch did in the construction of dykes in Lincolnshire, and from the weaving and other textile industries of Flemish and German aliens. That our suspicion of aliens is unreasoning is shown by the fact that those who are influenced by it to-day do not recognize what we have gained in the past from alien craftsmen, and have made no attempt to discover the actual facts of what contribution, if any, aliens are making to our trade at the present time. We can perhaps dimly imagine how intense this anti-alien feeling would become if all our big ports

—London, Liverpool, Cardiff, Glasgow, etc.—were partially controlled by prosperous and energetic Russians, Chinese, and Africans. Something like that is what China feels about the position we hold in her country. Anti-alien feeling is probably an inevitable sentiment in both countries. In the face of a feeling so strongly held, it is unreasonable to expect recognition of advantages received. Chinese anti-foreign feeling is therefore explicable without the hypothesis that China always has had and always will have an exaggerated dislike for foreigners. We too, in their case, should dislike foreigners equally heartily. But if it is true that an intense dislike for strangers is an essential Chinese characteristic, Chinese anti-alien sentiment is likely to be something deeper and more intense than our own.

At the start then, the connecting files between China and ourselves have a serious initial disadvantage. They are points not only of contact, but of friction and irritation. This may be very foolish. It may be true that if the Chinese were sensible they would be continually grateful to us for all that we are doing for the development of China's trade. The fact remains: they are not.

Whether or not the balance of profit is on China's side of the account or on ours is a matter for economists to decide. It is doubtful if there are enough data even for the most imaginative economist to decide at the present time. The development of contacts between our highly industrialized civilization and the less industrialized but equally compli-

cated civilizations of China and India is so recent and has been so rapid that it is not yet possible to say whether the advantages that have resulted in India and China outweigh the disadvantages. There is a growing opinion in India that the introduction of a higher standard of living into a country has the same bad effect upon it that we believe the introduction of a lower standard would have upon Australia and Canada. The settlement of that issue rests with the economists of the future. Till then plain men will hold that our trade relations with China are on the whole beneficial to her as well as to ourselves.

The effect of the special position of our trade upon Chinese sentiment is, however, the prime factor in Sino-British relations. It is not enough to dismiss Chinese sentiment in this matter as an inferiority complex. Or, if we do, we may have to apply the same definition to our own anti-alien sentiment. We must face the fact that right at the nerve centre of our whole system of relations with China there is a source of continual irritation to the Chinese. We live, as it were, in a glass house, a place in which the ordinary, hurly-burly, get-what-he-wants-at-all-costs type of Englishman will not find himself very comfortable. We can imagine that Frenchmen, perhaps, whose houses always seem to us of rather a flimsy order, are better trained to comport themselves successfully in such fragile surroundings. Strangely enough, whatever may be the reason, the French do seem to get away with things in a remarkable way in China. It is

difficult sometimes to remember that a large French Settlement marches with the International Settlement in Shanghai: one so seldom hears that matters which trouble the International Settlement trouble the French authorities next door. Is this possibly due to the possession by the average Frenchman of larger powers of imagination?

The importance of this element of sentiment in our relations will be differently estimated by different people. Unfortunately the different estimates differ as a rule with the position of the writer. The man who is intent to uphold the *status quo*, or eager to make it more so, invariably scorns Chinese national sentiment as the froth of a noisy and worthless faction, unworthy of the now honourable title of "minority." His opponent equally invariably will quote what China wants and what China thinks, and will place great stress upon the importance of this nascent public opinion, which he calls "China" or "the Chinese."

The truth of the matter may lie half-way between the two. May it not be true that there exists a "vague feeling" which, though it cannot be called public opinion, cannot be disregarded? Commander King-Hall, in *Western Civilization and the Far East*, maintains at the outset that he writes for the masses, as their "vague feelings" are, he believes, of the greatest importance. A remarkable leading article appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* during the mining stoppage, pointing out that the government had failed to realize that what they were really up

against was just such a "vague feeling." Though the leader-writer did not use that term, he stressed as something of ultimate importance in the whole question of settlement, the emotional tone with which the question of hours had come to be regarded by the miners, and condemned the government for not appreciating this emotional element in the situation. I believe there exists in China a similar "vague feeling," a feeling more powerful in its effects than similar feelings in our own country, because of the much lower standard of literacy. "Bazaar rumours" are a well-known feature of the village life of illiterate India. If our contact with China were as intimate as our contact with India we should perhaps appreciate more than we do the prevalence and influence of this type of emotionally felt idea. The most outstanding example of the power of an idea of this kind is demonstrated by the failure of Yuan Shih-Kai to establish himself as Emperor, and the very plain recognition that any attempt to do that is quite impossible to-day. It is the existence of this vague feeling which has made the Chinese Tu-chun of recent years so ridiculous in success. Logically, a successful Tu-chun can do nothing but go on to establish a new dynasty. That being impossible, he generally attempts to establish a parliament or a president, or both. But he understands neither, and therefore fails ludicrously to consolidate his success. In Tu-chun warfare nothing has failed like success. The reason is the existence of this powerful vague

feeling in a people quite unable to resist armed force, but so utterly weary of the corruption and misrule of the Manchus that it will not countenance any suggestion of a similar type of government.

A similar "vague feeling" has been steadily growing for some time in China as to her relation with foreign powers. To call it "national consciousness" and leave it at that is not enough. It is a national consciousness with a particular objective. This objective, though particular, is not definite. Just because it is not definite, it is all the more powerful. It has, however, a general direction. It is directed against the "unequal" treatment that China feels she has received at the hands of foreign nations.

The vagueness of this feeling accounts for the very different manner in which it is estimated by foreigners. It is so vague as to be discounted by one group, and so universally felt that the other group, who are as a whole in closer touch with the Chinese people in the realm of *feeling*, consider it of such importance as to justify them in saying that it expresses the "mind of China." On the whole it would be more accurate to use the word "feeling" rather than "mind." "Reaction" is not adequate to describe it. It is a feeling which manifests itself all over China in a unified reaction to the same stimulant. But it is growing steadily into something more than response to stimulation. But if the word feeling is used to describe this feature in China's national consciousness it must not imply

an unreasonable attitude, even if it is in a large measure unreasoning.

In the matter of our relations with China, as one people with another, the existence of this vague feeling is of the first importance. It is well for us to remember that our first wars with China were fought on the strength of the same kind of feeling. The nation was told that the "British flag had been insulted." The nation's response to this appeal was based on the vague feeling which we call national honour. The fundamental issue underlying that popular cry was recognized by Lord Palmerston in his instructions to the first Governor of Hong-Kong. It was the question of equality. It is on this same issue that the vague feeling of China to-day centres when it becomes articulate. Dr Sun Yat Sen has laid down that China will treat as a friendly power only those powers who treat China as an equal:

There are two ways in which Dr Sun would use People's Nationalism to save the nation. The first is positive, that is, stirring up the spirit of the people to seek for a solution of the questions of the people's rights and the people's livelihood in order that they may compete with foreign countries. The second is negative, that is, if the powers do not treat us on an equality we may refuse to co-operate with them in order to reduce the activities of imperialism.[1]

This interpretation is interesting as showing that the word imperialism means to China that attitude of patronage and superiority which treats another

[1] Dr Sun's Will interpreted by Dr King Chu. *Chinese Recorder*, Nov. 1926.

nation as an inferior people, without necessarily implying any purpose to exploit or control. It is on the basis of this equality principle that republican China accepts help from Russia. Russia does not pretend that her help is disinterested. She does not make "gestures of friendship." But she has an ambassador and not a minister at Peking, and in all her dealings she manages to preserve the psychology of equality. I have no knowledge as to whether or not this is genuine feeling, or a deliberate fraud for the furtherance of her own interests. The result is clear: China is treated as an equal. And if this is no more than saving China's face, it has at least all the value that saving face has at its best in Chinese thought and life. China's feelings and personality are respected. That matters everywhere. How much it matters is more commonly recognized in China than anywhere else. Is it not the best form of help that can be given to a country much more distressed by internal weaknesses than she will ever admit to outsiders?

What then is to be said about this matter of equality? No two countries are literally equal. China plainly is not the equal of Britain, territorially, politically, or in military power. The root of the trouble is in the word "equal." Its vague use in thought and speech confuses many issues. The word always raises the question, "equal in what?" As a "Power" China plainly is not the equal of Britain. Her army or navy could not stand up to ours for any length of time. As an

industrial country she is not our equal—though potentially she is our superior in that her natural resources are so much greater. But *as a people*, surely she is our equal? She has the same right to a place on the map as we have. In a family one brother may be more able. His advice will count for more in the family councils. He will also probably be able to help more in financial ways when there is sickness or trouble. But as one brother in the family he is the equal of all others. The least prosperous brother has the same right as he to a place as a son in the family. It is in this sense that China and Britain are equals, and it is a recognition of this kind of equality that is desired by Chinese sentiment.

It is noteworthy that, in dealings with China, Britain and other countries are almost invariably alluded to as "the Powers." This is an accurate description of Britain's attitude to China. Our dealings with her are practically limited to our dealings as a Power. There is little or no contact of people with people. Our knowledge of China is knowledge of her as a market or, in some circles, as a curiosity. We do not know her as a people.

It would be possible for us to follow the example of Russia and appoint an ambassador in place of a minister—an ambassador to the Chinese people, not to her government. The writ of a Chinese government does not yet run through China; but the Chinese people are an abiding reality. But to

appoint an ambassador to the Chinese people would be worse than useless, unless the act was the symbol of an attitude of mind—the attitude of mind of a people desiring to have the fullest possible intercourse with another people on the basis of equality, not as Powers, but as peoples. To do so, as some people recommend, as a "gesture of friendship" with an ultimate aim directed towards the betterment of trade, would be, not only mean, but futile. While the "Power" psychology dominates our thinking, the most friendly gestures will be unable to achieve results. Some action, some method of procedure, some speech will reveal what our real mind is. What we are will speak much louder than all the things we do. China is not looking for a change of policy so much as for a change of heart. Details of extra-territoriality and tariffs will settle themselves once the attitude is right.

It is towards a changed attitude of mind on the part of the British people, rather than towards immediate government action, that this book is directed. It is written in the hope that the Christian community, those who follow Christ in deed and thought, and not only in word and name, will lead the nation in the realization of this attitude. For it is the action not of sentimental but of Christian brotherhood that is needed. Sentiment is not enough. It must be an attitude of mind and will, a position of reasoned conviction, acquiring in time an emotional content. The emotional content which it will acquire will be an emotional

content like that which always accompanies friendship. It will be sturdy and reliable—not the facile and sentimental emotion which takes hold of us when our feelings are harrowed.

Existing contacts between China and Britain by which this friendship may be developed are remarkably few in number, much fewer and numerically smaller than one would expect from the extent of popular curiosity. Because they are so few, China remains a curiosity, and as a curiosity she takes a large place in popular imagination and in sensational literature. There is an element of mystery about her. Our minds are always fascinated by the mysterious. If our contacts with her were more numerous China would cease to be mysterious, and would automatically occupy less time and space in the popular imagination. Curiosity about China would then be much less: but real knowledge, even if it remains small in extent, is worth all the curious interest in the world.

Contacts between the two countries are shortly as follows:

1. Political contacts; limited to a small section of the consular and diplomatic service.

2. Economic contacts; very much larger but confined to a comparatively small section of the business world, and dominated by a handful of large concerns, whose combined interests in the trade of China are probably greater than all other interests put together.

3. Industrial contacts; remarkably small. Factories of any size under British control probably number little more than a score.

4. Missionary contacts; large compared with other contacts, but small in comparison with the extent of American missionary work in China or to the size of the country.

5. Public opinion through the press and exchange of literature and periodicals; difficult to estimate. It is limited in its extent, and is in the hands of a small number of people, but its influence is great, and in its effect upon the relations between the two countries the press has probably an overwhelmingly disproportionate influence.

6. Intellectual contacts; negligible, though a certain amount of school work is dominated by British ideas, and one or two Chinese university teachers of outstanding ability have some touch with British scholarship.

An examination of these contacts in a little more detail may make their relative importance clearer.

(1) *Political contacts.* Distance and the small extent of our other contacts are not the only reasons why our political contacts are so limited. Men and women with the mind and opportunity for political thought and work have many fields of interest which for one reason or another come before China. Problems of the British Commonwealth and its future development are in themselves of absorbing interest to minds of that type; India and colonial Africa have prior claims in the realm of national responsibility; the whole question of our relations with

Europe and with the United States of America inevitably presses much more insistently than China upon the attention of the official and unofficial mind.

The distance between China and Britain is therefore much more than geographical, as far as an understanding of her by the statesmanlike minds of Britain is concerned. The same, of course, is true of our relations with Mars. Our distance from her hypothetical inhabitants is much more than geographical. But there is an important difference. The inhabitants of Mars are, we can well believe, equally remote from us. The Chinese, on the other hand, are in a very real sense nearer to us than we are to them. In China the major problem of international statesmanship is the question of her relations with Britain. Only at rare and critical moments do relations with China become a major problem for Britain. In the realm of political interest we are China's nearest neighbour, whereas China is almost farther away from us than any other great block of the world's life. This disparity in mutual political interest is more than a case of "More people know Tom Noddy than Tom Noddy knows." The extent of our international connections inevitably means that there is more notice taken in, say, Luxembourg of what happens in Britain than is taken in Britain of what happens in Luxembourg. But Britain's attitude to Luxembourg and our dealings with her are not of primary significance and interest in the Duchy. What we do does not matter in the same way that what

Germany does or what France does matters. But in China what Britain does, and therefore what Britain thinks and says, matters seriously. With some reason China feels that British action will set the pace for the action of the other nations.

This remarkable disparity in mutual interest and knowledge probably accounts in a great measure for the ease with which misunderstandings arise between us. Britain gives to matters that come between the two countries eleventh-hour attention. China, on the other hand, has been brooding on them and thinking and talking about them all the eleven hours. Inevitably, therefore, we fail to appreciate what issues between us mean to China in the realm of feeling and life interest.

In what has been said no suggestion is made that Foreign Office departments concerned with China are any less efficiently staffed than any other departments. Recent events have demonstrated their ability. But we British people are incurably unbureaucratic, and Foreign Office experts are obviously placed in an impossible position if political thinkers among the rank and file of the country, who should share their burdens with them, do not do so. Open diplomacy depends much more on the thinking and writing of independent citizens with political and international interests than on publication of treaty details. Treaties, if they are to be open treaties between peoples, must be the result of real exchange of thought and of mutual interest and understanding between the *peoples* concerned. A sentimental

enthusiasm for the League of Nations is a positive danger to the peace of the world if the individual citizen has not a disciplined and informed interest in other peoples in general, and in the problems and outlook of one or more peoples in particular.

Our political relations with China will remain unsatisfactory until a much greater proportion than at present of the real statesmen of our country have mastered the political and economic problems involved in our relations with China. Lord Willingdon's mission in 1926 has demonstrated what a man with the mind and interests of a statesman can do in a very short time. But it has also revealed the barrenness of the land. China has now realized, even if Britain has not yet done so, how few of our statesmen have an intimate knowledge of China. Unless this weakness is remedied, and the policy of initiating more and more minds with a political orientation into the web of our relations with China is quite deliberately developed, a new barrier will arise. This barrier will be a legitimate resentment at a somewhat cavalier treatment, and an increased feeling of distrust based on the suspicion that our actions are not dictated by far-seeing statesmanship. National action which gives the appearance of inadequate consideration will never carry conviction.

(2) *Economic contacts.* Our best and most far-reaching contacts with China are commercial contacts. International commerce is *par excellence* the sacrament of international brotherhood. If proof were desired of the fatherhood of God and the

consequent essential brotherhood of man, the interdependence of nations in the realm of trade would be proof enough. The suicidal results of its so frequent abuse in hatred and international jealousies, so far from disproving, add immense weight to the argument. And that has always been the case in China. Merchants were the pioneers of our relations with China. They are still pioneering, not in the geographical sense of the early days, but in the more intricate and subtle realm of commercial and financial interdependence. In the old days when trade was in very elementary stages, appearances at any rate suggest that it paid us to go to war with China. To-day, war or its equivalent between China and Britain is being made increasingly suicidal by the steady interweaving of our interests. The necessity of commercial interdependence, a necessity more powerful than the necessity of the past and its legacy of apparently conflicting interests, is binding us together. If we desire to continue and to develop trade we cannot resist this process.

But that is not by any means the whole story of our commercial relations with China. Lasting individual friendships grow up between the British merchants and the Chinese with whom they have their most permanent dealings. These, with the development of trade, are creating the means of closer and closer co-operation in the future. But both friendship and trade itself are hindered very seriously indeed by the attitude of mind which regards China principally as a market. Not only

does this attitude limit many individual friendships, but it gives a certain atmosphere and temper to the whole sum of our relations with the Chinese people which is most unfortunate. Money-making is too mean an objective to fill the minds and interests of the majority of British business men in China, however important an element it may still be for the development of trade. They are, therefore, almost to a man interested in China and her doings in a live and intelligent way. Many do a great deal to help various philanthropic and social enterprises. But the fundamental mind-attitude which instinctively refers any event in China to the influence it will have on markets is almost universal.

It is, of course, true that our relations with every country are very largely influenced by our commercial interests, but that these are allowed to influence our attitude to China to an unnatural and unhealthy extent will be realized if our general attitude to China is compared with our attitude to Germany or India or Russia. In the last case this is particularly noticeable. Current history of our relations with Russia seems to be the history of an effort by commercial interests to change the attitude of the country as a whole towards Russia. When we think of Germany or of Russia or of India, we think of them primarily as peoples, with a national life of their own. We do not think of them primarily as customers.

So much is it the case that our attitude towards China is dominated by this market conception that a Chinese, remarkable alike for a stout friendship

for Britain and a brilliant power of analysis, describes our Chinese policy as a continual attempt to discover a strong man in China whom we can back in order to secure peaceful conditions *in which British trade may flourish*. The sting is in the last words. We are accused in them, with surely a fair measure of justice, of allowing our desires for our own trade to influence our conception of the political development of China. Our view of the internal situation in China is therefore biased from the start. We have our own ideas as to how China should develop, ideas formed not from a sympathetic study of her social and political mind-habits, but primarily from our own desire to see a settled regime as soon as possible. This attitude is more unfortunate than blameworthy, but it prejudices, none the less, the whole system of our relations.

It is interesting to notice how profoundly a slight psychological change would alter for the better not only the individual friendships of British and Chinese merchants, but the quality and tone of our national friendship for China. We may be a nation of shopkeepers. But we certainly do not as a nation live for shopkeeping. We live for life. We do not live to make money, but to use money. And we use it mainly for friendship and recreation, and for all the etceteras that accompany those intertwined activities. The psychological change that is needed is that this more fundamental life value should enter increasingly into our relations with Chinese merchants. Many friendly critics of the Union Club movement

in China decline to throw their weight into it because they feel that its atmosphere is one of friendship for the sake of business, rather than of friendship for the sake of life and the value of friendship itself.

Differing social habits make this slight but far-reaching change difficult to achieve. The way forward clearly lies in a recognition of the canker which is at the root of our mental outlook, and a refusal to allow it to lead us into a hypocritical position. We have a reputation for honesty. Fundamentally it is our honesty that is called in question. While our minds are dominated by the "China-as-a-market" idea, true friendship is impossible. One way through is to seek deliberately for intercourse on cultural matters and on questions of economic and political theory—realms from which the immediate market atmosphere can be most readily banished. An increasing tendency among individuals to think of and to know China as a nation, however disrupted, and as a people, instead of as a market, will react very quickly on our national attitude towards her.

(3) *Industrial contacts.* Though our contacts with Chinese labour in the industrial sphere are small, they have a quite disproportionate influence. It is this remarkable difference between extent and influence that has led to such an acute difference of opinion about British industrial enterprise in China. The replies given to questions in the House of Commons and the consular reports on industrial conditions in their districts [1] leave the real influence

[1] Published as a Grey Book; *Cmd.* 2442, 1925.

of our contacts entirely out of account, and are therefore as misleading as some of the cartoons which appeared in the summer of 1925 in certain sections of the British press, featuring the bloated Capitalist, rings couchant and cigar rampant, shooting Chinese child-workers with an impossible revolver. It is not enough to report, as in the government Grey Book, that the number of British controlled factories is very small (*e.g.* only five cotton mills), and that labour conditions in them are on the whole better than the average. And it is merely obscuring the issue to endeavour to shift responsibility on to the ineffectiveness of Chinese industrial law, and to ridicule the ignorance of Western Labour authorities as to real conditions in China. Those things are true. China is quite unable at the present time to enforce adequate factory legislation. And it is difficult for those in Britain, whose emotions have been roused by tales of industrial horrors, to realize how complicated the whole question is. But that is not the whole story.

A member of the staff of the *North China Daily News*, a paper which runs no risks of being unpractical or sentimental in its attitude to things Chinese, states in a series of articles printed in the late summer of 1926:

> Efficient factory managers in western countries are as concerned over the health and welfare of their employees as they are that machines should be well kept and well oiled. They abhor the constant turnover of labour and the loss of experienced help due to illness and premature death. . . .
>
> One of the principal tasks is to cut down fatigue

which is higher in factories here because of the type of food consumed, the climate, and general living conditions. A fatigued worker is inefficient and discontented, and is probably more ready to strike over small questions than a fresh, well-fed worker.

Without quoting figures of immense dividends, which are often inconclusive, or castigating the mentality of the management which closes its mills once a fortnight *to rest the machinery*, these words are sufficient condemnation of the existing state of affairs. It can be said of British mills that they are "above the average." But at its best that is pallid praise. (It is noteworthy also that in this series of articles it is a Japanese, and not a British mill, that comes in for special commendation, though this is not to be taken as typical of Japanese mills.)

This writer also gives the reasons why we cannot be content that British factories are small in numbers and above the average in their working conditions: in a foreign-owned factory there is always a danger of resentment at insistence upon foreign ways (even in welfare work). Because we are foreigners in China, we cannot afford to be less careful than we are in Britain for the well-being of industrial workers. We must face frankly and strenuously, as some firms are doing already, the fact that British industry has a reputation to live up to. And if we fail to do in China what we do in Britain, failure will be tantamount to an admission that we will not do what we are not forced

to do. There is no effective factory regulation in China, and Labour is not in the strong position that it occupies in England.

Those of us, however, who are grieved that British firms are not doing more to raise the standard of working conditions in China must always remember that individual employers must carry burdens in China that in England are shared with the State. Their difficulties are also greater than those of employers in the West because they are facing the different standards of life, and the different social customs, of another civilization.

It would also be well if we gave up using the word "exploitation" except for cases where deliberate intention to exploit exists. This is not true of British industry as a whole. The inevitable exploitation that accompanies the contact with a weaker nation of a strongly organized and equipped nation is not now conveyed by the word "exploitation." The word has acquired a bad character, and carries with it the sense of deliberate purpose.

Those, however, who have the industrial situation and our responsibility for it in their hearts and on their consciences are profoundly right. It is of vital importance, for two reasons. In the first place, because we are helping to build up an unhealthy industrial population in China, with all the amount of human misery that will entail for the future as well as for the present; and, secondly, because it is dishonest for us to talk of genuine friendship for China while our nationals are treating Chinese

labourers in a way that would not be tolerated in this country.

Mr Oldham, in *Christianity and the Race Problem*, emphasizes the remarkable achievements of British justice. He instances the success of a petty chief in Africa in a case against the Crown. But there is no country in the world where bare legal justice is better recognized for what it is worth than China. Justice must go much deeper than the law courts can take it. British justice is itself judged every day, not by the working of its courts, but by the behaviour of British people in their dealings with a people who are unable to control our everyday dealings with them. It is what we do outside the law that matters. Fair play goes much deeper than fair trial. The industrial question in China is fundamentally a question of fair play.

Moreover, those Chinese who count themselves the friends of Britain and are anxious to rebuild friendly relations between us, naturally look to us, who have more experience than any other country in industrial adjustment and development, to give her the benefit of our experience.

Another point of great significance in the articles just quoted is the proved statements that the great majority of the strikes in the period under review had no political content. In almost every case, in a period of two and a half months, the cause of the strike was either a demand for an increased rice allowance, or a dispute over a question of management or discipline. This is especially illuminating

in view of the popular theory that every strike is organized by communist agitators with a political purpose. It looks as if a failure to grapple in a really large-hearted and far-seeing way with labour conditions was giving the agitator just the material that he himself is labouring to secure. Self-interest alone should wake us from our present almost criminal lethargy in this matter. Even if British mill interests were smaller than they are, this would be of vital importance. It is not the number of the mills we have that affects the situation, but rather that any mills at all under British control in another country should not reflect more nearly British labour conditions at their best.

(4), (5) and (6) *Missionary, press, and cultural contacts*. Nothing exemplifies more clearly the unhealthiness of our relations with China than the serious cleavage that has arisen in recent years between average "missionary" opinion and "commercial" opinion, as the latter is expressed at any rate in the English press in China, and reflected in the tone of much of the press in Britain. So much has this been so that a leading English publicist has been on a tour of what he himself described as "propaganda" against the missionary point of view. The results of a spirit of this kind are evident in the very different views that are taken of the same facts by different writers. Each group unconsciously acquires a biased point of view. The concern of each group is therefore to make facts fit a viewpoint already adopted and fought for, rather than to estimate the real

significance of facts as they arise. The main cause of this difference is neither the "sentimental" idealism of the missionary, nor the unscrupulousness of the journalist, nor the selfishness of the business man. The main cause of it is that our contacts with China are so limited that the missionary leaders' point of view has an influence and a publicity far beyond what it is really qualified to enjoy. And the same is true of the very brilliant journalists, who tell us all about China in books as easily read as newspaper articles. Our views about most other countries are not formed in this way. They are interpreted to us by men of statesmanship and large vision, whose experience of life is wider than the necessarily limited experience of the missionary or commercial community. The one group knows Chinese feeling pretty accurately, the other is an equally good thermometer of foreign club opinion at its best. Neither is really in a position to judge of the other or of China as a whole.

Under existing conditions this debating society method of informing British public opinion about China and the Chinese will inevitably continue. The need of statesmen interpreters to remedy this situation has already been emphasized. There is a similar need for scholars who will do for the understanding of China in Britain and of Britain in China what scholars of all countries in Europe are now doing for mutual understanding in the circle of European nations. That there is not the same cultural affinity between Britain and China as there is

between Britain and most other important national groups makes intellectual co-operation more difficult at the outset. But there is every reason to suppose that just because our cultures are so different, we shall gain more by close intellectual co-operation than is possible between two countries of some cultural affinity.

Educated China has been trying now for nearly two generations to understand our culture. There are signs to-day that she will reject as of no use to her a great deal of it. That rejection will be made on knowledge. Educated Britain is still ignorant of the culture of China. May there not be in Chinese life and thought ideas and practices and values which we can adapt with advantage to our own needs and problems? Certainly this much is true. Our problems to-day are dominated by the fact that there is no more room for us to expand. The British Commonwealth is rapidly becoming a settled community. That has been China's situation down the ages—the problem of adjustment in a settled civilization. We would do well to look to her experience for help as we too set out to become at last a settled people within the limits of the Commonwealth.

CHAPTER VI

CHRISTIAN RELATIONS

Two of the students who fell on the Nanking Road on May 30th, 1925, were in close touch with the Chinese Student Christian Movement, though they were not actually members. The action taken by the Movement in the next few weeks is remarkable. The whole work of the Movement for the summer months was upset, and all conferences were cancelled. Schools and colleges were either closed or in chaos, as a result of the wave of strong national feeling which swept the country. In the face of this serious anti-British feeling, the general secretaries of the Chinese Y.M.C.A., of which the Chinese Student Christian Movement is a large and integral part, met in Shanghai to consider what action they could take. Like other organizations they passed resolutions. The following sentences are typical:

> We should . . . create . . . a proper public opinion . . . and promote good relationships among the nations to prevent future wars and realize the highest ideals we have cherished.

But, unlike most other organizations, they acted. They cabled to Britain urgently inviting a secretary of the British Student Christian Movement to join their staff, a staff then composed of over three hundred

Chinese secretaries, sixty secretaries from the United States, three Canadians, three or four Scandinavians, and one Scotsman seconded by his Church for work in Moukden. A British secretary on the staff of the National Committee had been asked for continually in the preceding years without success. But in the thick of anti-British feeling this request was pressed with insistent urgency, and was at last successful.

This courageous action by men who are known to many of their compatriots as the "Running Dogs of Western Capitalism," or as the "Faithful Servants of God" (God meaning, of course, foreign battleships), cannot probably be appreciated in this country. A parallel action would have been for the British Y.M.C.A. to have invited in the year 1919 a secretary of the German Y.M.C.A. to England to join its headquarters staff for work amongst British Army men. The Y.M.C.A. has in China a much stronger and more influential position even than in Britain. It does work that is carried on in England by such various organizations as the Adult School Movement, the Student Christian Movement, University Settlements, C.O.P.E.C., etc. Having a membership of nearly fifty thousand, and centres in every town of importance, it is the largest and strongest organization of any kind in China, with the single exception of the Kuo Min Tang (the Republican party founded by Sun Yat Sen). In the face of a determined and unusually vocal patriotic movement this association of young Christian men, second to none in patriotic devotion, took a determined public stand for a spirit

of forgiveness, understanding and co-operation in international relations.

In this fact there is something tremendously significant. East and West are being thrown into increasingly acute conflict by forces apparently beyond the control of either. But in this action taken by the Chinese Y.M.C.A. is evidence of a power greater than the power of national feeling or of economic necessity.

It was suggested in the last chapter that the relatively disproportionate influence enjoyed by missionary leaders in the whole system of our relations with China was inevitable, but unfortunate. Because missionaries are free, though they may not wish to be, from the responsibilities of commerce and of government, their judgment on affairs must inevitably reflect the limitations of their experience. But on the other hand the action just described, taken by Christian Chinese and their missionary colleagues because of their Christian faith, suggests that there lies in the link that has been forged by the missionary movement a bond between China and Britain of incalculable possibilities. In the weeks following May 30th all other links between China and Britain were strained beyond breaking point. This one link held firm.

The action taken by the Y.M.C.A. has had results far beyond expectation in strengthening other links which had worn thin, and in actually forging new links which may prove of remarkable value in the next few years. Is it possible then so to develop

the link that has been forged by British missionaries that it may contribute something of lasting and enduring value to the whole system of relations between China and Britain ? There is no intention to suggest that the missionary movement is an auxiliary, a subordinate auxiliary as some would hold, of the League of Nations. The missionary movement is an independent instrument of God's purpose for the world, with a different and more inclusive object. It values the brotherhood of men, not because it is the only alternative to the horrors of war, but because of what it believes about God and consequently about the meaning of life. It is for this reason, because of its belief about God, that the missionary movement is vitally concerned with the whole question of relations between our two countries.

But it must be remembered that in comparison with the tremendous extent of the missionary contacts that exist between China and the United States, British missionary contacts are small. A few outstanding personalities have done a great deal to compensate for the small number of British missionaries; but they have not been able to do away with the impression created in the minds of many casual observers in China that we are not as interested in helping China as are some other countries, notably America, whose commercial interests in China are so much smaller. This unfortunate impression has naturally some influence on Sino-British relations. It is difficult for China to know that in proportion to the wealth and strength

of our Churches, the British missionary enterprise, though not what we would like to see it, does not fall behind the American movement. Nor can it be fairly said that China is neglected, when our spiritual responsibilities in Africa and India are considered.

However, we could make no better response to the courageous action taken by the young Christians of the Chinese Y.M.C.A. than to send, in response to their pressing invitations, more men of really outstanding intellectual and spiritual gifts to China; and to invite more freely than in the past her Christian leaders and students to visit British universities and churches to teach us about China and to take back with them anything from our experience which may be of use to them in their work there. In the face of existing anti-British feeling in China, and when every effort is being made to facilitate China's desire to make the Chinese Christian Church more truly Chinese than it has been in the past, this suggestion may appear untimely. St Francis in his address to the soldiers in the Saracen camp has answered the first objection :

Love looked down and beheld Hate,
Thither will I go, said Love.

With regard to the second, it is just in these critical years of transition that the need is most urgent for self-effacing men and women, who will stand by as friends without attempting to control their Chinese Christian colleagues.

Chinese Christians will do their best to make the

link of Christian brotherhood a reality; but if we are to do what God surely would have us do—develop and strengthen the bond of brotherhood and mutual service which now exists between our two countries—there must be a greatly increased reinforcement from our side. This reinforcement, however, must be not only of men and money, or even primarily of men and money, but of that sympathy and interest of which men and money are ambassadors. It is in the realm of the spiritual bond of genuine sympathy and interest that those of us who are bound to China by religious ties have the greatest opportunity.

There are, however, friction points between the Christian communities of the two countries similar to, though not identical with, the friction points in the commercial sphere. Students of missions in India in the years since the war will be well aware of the crucial difficulties that have had to be faced in India in the relation of the young Indian Church to the old missionary organization. This strain in relations within the Christian body is not so acute in China; but it very certainly exists. It was put to me very graphically, though unintentionally, by a young British missionary on the staff of one of the largest British mission schools in China. I asked him if, between the senior Chinese masters and the senior British masters on the staff, there was the same intimacy that there would be between them if they were all British, and if the little group around the Principal, which is the real heart-centre of any school life, was composed of both Chinese and

British indiscriminately. He answered at once that he could not say it was. "But," he added, "our best men got light-headed in the trouble and went off." He was quite unconscious of the contradiction in what he had said. Plainly they were either not "the best," or "light-headed" was an inadequate way to describe their feelings about "the trouble." (The "trouble" was, of course, the shooting in Shanghai on May 30th, 1925.) The Christian link was not then, and is not now, strong enough to hold at all points. The fundamental difference of thought outlook between British and Chinese influences relations between them even within the Christian fellowship.

We must face up to the fact that we are still the same people as our restless wandering forefathers. We still love to do things, and to manage things for others. Readers who agreed with the attempt to summarize the main features of our national character in a previous chapter will readily realize how difficult it is for us to work on terms of complete brotherhood and intimate fellowship with people whose whole conception of what matters in life's everyday actions is so fundamentally different from our own. The Roman Catholic Church with its customary acumen is facing this difficulty. Counting perhaps more on the weakness of human nature than on the power of Christian idealism, the Roman Church proposes to remove all missionaries from the area which is to be under the guidance of the Chinese Bishops who were recently consecrated in Rome. Non-Roman Missions have

decided, at the request of their Chinese colleagues quite as much as on their own initiative, to try a harder but, as they believe, a better way. They are endeavouring to obliterate the distinction between foreign and Chinese. The missionary is to work as a fellow-helper with Chinese colleagues, and enjoy the same basis of authority and influence as they do. The Chinese trust that at points where there is difference of opinion the Chinese view will be allowed to prevail, on the ground that the people whom both are trying to reach for Christ are Chinese.

We must face the fact that our national characteristics do not naturally fit us for this position. Consequently the conflict between the "best" Chinese Christians and British missionaries, which had arisen in the British mission school referred to above, is in a large measure inevitable, desperately serious though it is for the whole development of a really indigenous Chinese Church.

But the situation is not hopeless. The very cause of the present friction can become a source of unity and strength if its real significance is understood.

I will use the term Viking as a picturesque symbol for the British life-outlook described in a previous chapter. It emphasizes that element in our outlook in which we are essentially different from China, and also suggests, what I believe to be true, that in *life-outlook* we are still in the main what we were before the influence of Christianity reached us.

God made the world which made us Vikings. We won through to the understanding of many life

values in the days when we roamed through the forests of northern Europe, and sailed in those famous wooden ships in northern European seas. Can we dare to say that those values are not God-given? That robust, almost militant honesty of ours that is so different from the more patient truthfulness of the New Testament, must surely come from all the dealings that our rugged forefathers had with the same God whom we now know in Christ to be Christ-like?

Let us be quite clear that we are, and that God wants us to be, *more* than Christians. We are Christian Vikings. The Christian missionary enterprise when it reached our forefathers did not put them into touch with God for the first time. It showed them the nature and character and purpose of the God with whom they had always been united as creatures to Creator. And by so doing, by showing them their Father's face, it has done a great deal to strengthen and purify and energize all that they had in the past more slowly and less certainly felt to be the truth about things. We are more than Christian, in the sense that we are more than Christianity as a religious system could have made us; but not more than Christian, in the sense that everything good in what we are comes from the God who has revealed Himself to us in Christ.

If we can get a really strong convinced understanding on this central fact of our own religious history, it will do a great deal to remove the friction that naturally arises now in our dealings with the

Chinese Christian Church. For it will help us to see, what we do not at present really grasp with the whole consent of our deepest feelings and convictions, that the religious history of the Chinese is parallel to our own. Like our forefathers they have been led, as far as they in their turn have been willing to be led, by the same God. We were restless people, often in a rugged and barren land. We have moved on from place to place in search of a living. Our position in China to-day is the result of that same movement, though to-day our ships are of steel and our weapons have a longer reach than the weapons of our ancestors. The Chinese have had an essentially different past. Their lessons about God and about life have been learnt in settled communities in the desperate effort to make a living and to lead a comparatively peaceful life within the large family unit with its many conflicting claims and difficult personalities.

Our way has been to cut the painter: to leave parents and elders who cramped our initiative, and to leave a countryside which did not hold out to us the promise of a decent living. China's solution has been to develop the arts of intensive cultivation, and the still subtler arts of community living. We cannot believe this to be any less God's way for her than our solution has been God's way for us. We can and must believe that these different products of our differing histories have meaning in the whole purpose of the universe.

Our missionary efforts in China must then share

the spirit of the early missionaries to northern Europe. Our purpose must be to unfold the nature and character and purpose of the God who has made and sustains both nations. We go to present what we have learnt about God from the Jews and their converts in southern Europe, and have verified since in our own experience. But we go, and this is the realization that is so vital, we go still as Vikings —Christian Vikings, but still Vikings.

But God does not want us to make the Chinese Vikings. He could have arranged their past differently if that had been His purpose. We are in China to pass on what we have learnt in Christ about God. The Chinese with whom we come in contact, learning in Christ to know the meaning of their own past as we have learnt to know the meaning of our own Viking past, will become Christian Chinese, but Chinese still. They will see their old virtues, as we have not yet learnt to see ours, as their own virtues, special and peculiar to them as ours are special and peculiar to us, but essentially the gift of the same, one, universal Christ-like God.

But God has also given China a trust for us. In the special and peculiar virtues which God and His Chinese people have worked out in the past there must be something of universal value, something which God has entrusted to them that they may teach us and the world in general—virtues or values or methods which the world wants and can learn only from China. In the same way there may be similar things in our Viking repertory—virtues,

values, methods—of universal application, entrusted to us who first learned them for all mankind. But the vital distinction between these extra-Christian virtues and our central Christian message comes in at this point. We are probably the only people in the world who are not qualified to determine which of our virtues, values and methods are of universal application. In the same way, of course, the Chinese are equally unfitted to decide what features in their repertory are of universal, and what are of purely Chinese, application.

It must be becoming every day increasingly clear that the one indisputable fact about God's purpose for the world, on the face of it, perhaps, more indisputable than the purpose of brotherhood, is the purpose of difference. We are all meant to be ourselves—Yellow, Black, Pale Pink, or Brown, and not a dull and uniform grey. Obviously Yellow cannot say to Black, "These characteristics of mine are just the thing for you." Yellow can only say to Black, "Those characteristics of yours are just the thing that we have lacked down the ages. Come and let us learn from you." In the same way Pale Pink cannot say to Yellow, "God has given us courage and honesty and manliness, cold baths, dumb-bells and footballs, and we are coming to teach you to be like us." We can and must say, "The God who has made us both, not what we are, but capable of becoming beyond all that we can ask or think, has shown to men His face, His nature and character and purpose in Jesus of Nazareth.

Because we have become convinced that in Him is the clue alike to the life of man and the life of God, we are bound to endeavour to present to you what it all means. We believe that it matters to God that you too should see Him as we have come to see Him. We believe it will make a vast difference to everything in your life, as it has made a vast difference in our lives, to company in conscious fellowship with the world's Creator. We cannot tell you what differences it will make to you. But we can say this: it will make better and richer and stronger all that is now good and rich and strong in your family life, in your individual life, and in your national life. It will not destroy, it will enrich. You will remain Chinese as we remain Vikings; but Chinese with a difference, as we hope to become, much more than we are now, Vikings with a difference."

If an attitude of that kind could become not only a theory but a deep conviction in our hearts and minds, we should hear less than we do at present of the "best" of "our" Chinese Christians becoming "light-headed." We should also perhaps never hear again that terribly tell-tale phrase "our Chinese." The Chinese Chairman of the Chinese Christian Council would not again have to rebuke his foreign brethren as he did in 1926, speaking the truth in love, because the "superiority complex" in far too many missionaries proves a hindrance to the work of the Christian Church in China.

An example of what this means in everyday life

is provided by the Chinese New Year festival. It is good to be able to acknowledge our indebtedness to Mr Rodney Gilbert for his brilliant and illuminating comparisons between our Christmas customs and the customs of the Chinese New Year. Father Christmas with his store of good things seems remote enough from the Chinese god of the kitchen sent up to heaven with his mouth stuffed full of good things to ensure a favourable report upon the morals of the household. But they both use the chimney; red, the colour of the fire and the hearth, is common property between them; and the kitchen god's return corresponds roughly with Twelfth Night. The survival of the name "Twelfth Night" suggests that the association of the Epiphany with that date was an ingenious device to Christianize an old winter solstice festival, corresponding to the Chinese festival, which was too strong to be entirely eliminated. So to-day in China it is quite plain that Chinese New Year—the great annual holiday and festival, a movable feast depending on the lunar calendar—has a much stronger hold on Chinese Christians than the Christmas festival we have imported. Their feeling about the New Year festival is like our feeling for Christmas—something so much a part of national life that it carries all before it. Christmas is more to us than a Christian festival. It is a national festival Christianized. Christmas will never be to Chinese Christians what it is to us until it coincides with their New Year festival. A nice question then arises, parallel to the disputes about the date of Easter

which shook the young British Christian Church in Wilfrid's day, and still divides Western and "Orthodox" Christians: is China to stabilize her calendar to make it coincide with the Western Christmas and New Year date, or is the Chinese Christian Church to keep Christmas as late sometimes as the middle of February?

The case of the traditional Chinese emphasis on the family is still more remarkable. At the Tenth Triennial Y.M.C.A. Convention in August 1926, Professor T. C. Chao, one of the most outstanding Chinese Christian teachers of to-day, summed up his Christian faith as follows (I am paraphrasing from an interpretation so make no claim to verbal accuracy): "God as Father; Christ as Saviour; and the Kingdom of God as the Home of the Children of God." "The Home of the Children of God" is the significant phrase. China's past is here providing Christ with an idea that was not available in Judaism. Our Lord's sense of God as Father had to struggle with and was often defeated by the popular sense of God as King. The word Kingdom, or Reign, which He was compelled to use to express the new system of relations between God and man which He inaugurated, plainly works against His teaching of God as Father and for the popular view He endeavoured to destroy of God as King. The home —given all the values that attach to it in China as the basis of the life of society—has not this drawback. Here is something that China has learnt from God outside Christianity which she

is bringing now to Christ and consecrating to His service.

One further illustration will show how much the values of family life are permeating Chinese Christianity. The findings of the Annual Meeting of the Chinese Christian Council in September 1926, suggest the following four approaches to a better realization of "actual living of the Christ-like life made possible by *union* with Christ." (I have necessarily summarized the original.)

I. *Devotional Approach:*
   - A. Bible Study.
   - B. Prayer.

II. *Family Approach:*
   - A. In family *living*.
   - B. In the family as the true centre of Christian *education*.

III. *Practical Approach:*
   - A. The *mind* of Christ in social and international issues.
   - B. The Christ *life* in warfare against social evils.

IV. *Personal Approach:*
   In individual evangelism.

Would any group of Western Christians put the family approach in that position? Would it not come as a sub-heading under I, perhaps as "family prayers," and under III, probably under "warfare against social evils"?

A mystery still remains unsolved. Why should we Viking folk have been entrusted with this literally awe-full trust of the knowledge of God in Christ ?

No one of us is qualified to deal with this mystery of God's working. It is, however, a much more burning and difficult question in China, with its so different religious heritage, than it is in the West. It is of interest to notice that as a matter of actual fact it is partly because of the Viking in our hearts that we are missionaries at all. It is the same will to achieve that has made both our non-Christian industrial civilization, and the modern Christian missionary enterprise. There is more truth in the insight of the Chinese Anti-Christian Movement than we, or even they, would generally admit. They see in the relentless and restless industrial expansion of the West and in its equally relentless and restless missionary enthusiasm twin aspects of one activity. If we can recognize this more clearly than we now do we shall perhaps be able to avoid better than we are now able that imperious temper, which may be our undoing alike in commerce and in our missionary endeavours. It must remain servant and not master. As servant it has made us missionaries—propagandists and ambassadors. As master it may destroy what we have achieved. We must remain Vikings, but Christian Vikings, not, as so often now, Viking Christians.

I have been dealing in this chapter with a relation between China and Britain which, in spite

of its disproportionate influence, is essentially a sectional relation. What, if any, is the connection between this particular religious relation with China and the other sectional relations with her ? Commerce, and public opinion as expressed through literature and the Press, are plainly less sectional than the religious link. They too are carried on through a section only of the community, but they commit the whole community, and concern the whole community. The Christian missionary enterprise obviously is not a national undertaking. It is an enterprise carried on by a certain section of the community because of their belief about the nature of God and His purpose for the world, a belief which is not shared by the community as a whole outside the Christian fellowship. But plainly the nation as a whole cannot be indifferent to activities maintained on such a large scale by British nationals in China, especially in view of the serious shortage of statesmanlike minds occupied with questions of Sino-British relations. For missionary leaders have an influence in our national councils on Chinese questions quite disproportionate to the numerical importance of the Christian enterprise.

It has already been remarked that in the strained and difficult period that followed " May 30th," at least one of the links forged by the Christian community between China and Britain held when most others gave way, and that this has had a remarkable influence in helping other links that had worn thin

to renewed efficiency and power. May not some such deeper holding power be part of the special function of the Christian community in the whole system of relations between China and Britain? The British Government, representing as it does so many people who do not hold the Christian view of God and of life, cannot be expected to act as if it were the government of an entirely Christian community. But the British Christian community can surely develop some form of direct dealing with the Christian community in China. This must not replace but must supplement endeavours to make our people and consequently our government more and more Christian.

The Chairman of the Chinese National Christian Council, Dr David Yui, said in my hearing last year: "I can make no answer when my non-Christian friends ask me: What, after all, has Christianity done for the West?"—so seriously does the shadow of the Great War, as Christianity's greatest failure, conceal smaller, though perhaps more significant, achievements. Later, however, Dr Yui admitted that the fact that the Christian community as such had been able to stand fearlessly for Christian values in the great industrial crisis of 1926 had at last given him something that he could set against the war failure. Here at last was evidence of a new power at work in national life. The better therefore we are able to fulfil at home our Christian duty as the fellowship of the living Christ in the life of the nation, the more will the link that

has been made by the missionary enterprise be strengthened.

As the Chinese Church grows in strength and influence and spiritual wisdom, the new factor already introduced into Sino-British relations by the missionary enterprise will take on new significance. Dealing direct with each other the two Christian bodies, sharing a common loyalty and a common faith, may be able to achieve real understanding and co-operation between the two countries on a scale not otherwise possible.

It should by now have become clear that the mistakes and failures which we tend to ascribe to "bad whites" living in the East lie much nearer home. Those "bad whites" are, in the sense in which we mean it, much less common than we imagine. The whipping boy employed by King Edward VI has his parallels in our own lives. We take refuge from unpleasant features in our own consciousness by allowing others to be whipped for us. Christians interested in the missionary enterprise and traders interested in the commercial enterprise are equally "bad whites," just so long as both allow a feeling of superiority to feed our naturally imperious temper. The stress laid so often in the past at missionary meetings, and, alas, not unknown in the present, on the inferiority of Eastern peoples is as responsible as ship's bar-room gossip for the unfortunate episodes of bad manners which still far too often happen in China.

Even more serious, because not sufficiently recog-

nized as bad, is the almost unconscious assumption of superiority that underlies so much of our every-day thought and conversation about China—the thought that is, for instance, implicit in the use of the word "Chinaman." China prefers the English word "Chinese" both as noun and adjective. It is lack of courtesy not to call any nationals by the term they prefer. The term "Chinaman" is hated now by the Chinese as much as the contemptuous "native" by Indians.

Christians and non-Christians alike will do much for the improvement of Sino-British relations by quietly, deliberately, and intelligently disabusing the minds of those many people who still in their thinking and talking about the East mistake difference for inferiority. But to the Christian community as a whole this has a more intimate and serious appeal. We are too much mission-field-minded. Our anger with the militarists in China is too often not because they are wicked but because their wickedness hinders the spread of the Gospel. In God's eyes the wrong that any man or any government does matters because it is wrong. Because we see China's difficulties so often with the Gospel-hindrance emphasis we cause a natural irritation at the narrowness of our outlook in the minds even of Christian Chinese.

Again, there is an element of justice in the plea of some commercial men in China that missionary anxiety to be free of extra-territoriality is based not on abstract justice, but on the sense that missionary

work is hindered by it. This is not a fair criticism of all missionaries, nor is it, probably, the only factor in the mind of any missionary, but it does represent an attitude on this issue which exists and which is fundamentally wrong. God is much more than our poor thinking of Him, and the life of the world as He has made it is much more than our ideas of just spreading the Gospel. Unchristian dealing matters tremendously, not because the success of the missionary enterprise is impaired, but because fundamental life values—truth and love and beauty—are hurt by it.

The very indulgence of our imaginations in thinking of the wickedness of others keeps us from the real issue—ourselves. We know that adulterous thoughts are as abominable to Christ as adulterous actions, and to us, if we are honest, more abominable because more cowardly. Wrong thoughts therefore about China are as serious as wrong actions; they hinder the real spiritual power that is in understanding and sympathy. Ordinary everyday "us" who make up the Christian Church and who help to make public opinion in Britain are as blameworthy, and as much a hindrance to God, if our *thoughts* about China are wrong, as are any of those in actual daily contact with the Chinese.

Even our great missionary leaders are not free from this responsibility. After listening to an address by one of the most progressive leaders of missionary interest in England, a Chinese visitor in his audience remarked, "His real subject was not,

as on the programme, 'Africa and the Africans,' but 'The Missionary and his Africa.'" Again, in discussing with a friend in close touch with many Christian leaders on the continent plans for a book on the European countries to be written on the lines of the missionary text-book, I was strongly advised against the proposal on the ground that it was impossible to write anything without wounding the sensibilities of the countries concerned. If the book had been on a "mission-field country" this objection would not have been raised.

The fundamental wrongness that is in our mission-field-mindedness is demonstrated by those two incidents. The distinction that is made, however unconsciously, between Europe and the Far East is typical of it. It will be said that Europe is not a mission field. That reply is again another sign of the disease. "The field is the world" as much now as it was two thousand years ago, and the world includes Europe and Britain. It is the habit of mind that regards Africa and the East as the "mission field" that makes our understanding so incomplete. Our talking is nearly always under the title "The missionary and his world" rather than "God and His world." We forget that God is interested, for example, in the agriculture of China as well as in church services or in any missionary activity. He is as glad when His sons go to work in His vineyard as He is when they recognize Him for whom they are working; unless perhaps we should include under gladness the profound joy which cannot

be uttered that comes when the fellowship between Father and son becomes the closest co-operation of understanding mind and will.

Those of us who are interested in the development of Christianity throughout the world seem unable to get away from lateral conceptions of the relation of God to man. God must, we imagine, though not realizing how much we imagine it, work from London or New York if He is to reach the East. We should rather think in vertical terms, if we must think at all in terms of time and space. We shall perhaps in that way arrive at a conception of the life of God flowing without stint into the corporate and individual life of all nations, and finding expression in religion, and art, and every creative activity of human living.

The antithesis between Christendom and the non-Christian world will then disappear, and the fatal barrier to Sino-British relations which it causes be removed. We shall have a truer image in our minds, an image of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ struggling to fulfil in Christ all that men everywhere are doing in response to His creative urging. China and Britain stand side by side, each related independently to God, and to one another. Among the creative influences of trade and art, and thought, which bind each nation to the other, and help each forward to the fulfilment of its destiny, the fellowship of the Christian brotherhood will run like a golden cord, tied at one point in time and space to God, and carrying along its length its

strange power of linking men afresh to God through the life and influence of Christ. This surely does not minimize the vital importance of the missionary enterprise, but rather emphasizes that it is being conducted in a world already God-possessed, and God-dominated.

CHAPTER VII

FUNDAMENTALS

A WRITER whose conception of the universe is limited to an unscientific evolutionary conception which, perhaps unconsciously, regards the political institutions of Britain as the latest, if not the final development of human organization, will have one opinion about the Chinese Republic. Another whose conceptions are based mainly on the Old Testament will probably have a different one: it will be more paternalistic. Another whose conceptions come to him mainly through the New Testament as interpreting the Old, and through the history of Christianity since New Testament times, will probably approach the question in an entirely different manner.

No judgment on China or things Chinese made in this book or in any other should be accepted until it is made clear on what conception of the universe such a judgment is based. When a writer says that this or that is true about China, or about any other country, he should always be asked another question—what does he believe about God and consequently about the world? Celsus, for instance, condemned the first Christian community because it was composed of humbugs, thieves, and every kind of criminal. On his conception of the universe he

was right in his judgment. But to the first Christians, because of their belief about God, those same humbugs and thieves and every kind of criminal were the most precious jewels in the crown of their fellowship. Celsus told the truth. They *were* humbugs and thieves and every kind of criminal. But then his idea of God was inadequate. If a man imagines God to be different from what He is, any calculations based ultimately on his estimate of God are likely to be miscalculations. If $a=2$, $2a=4$. But if a is something infinite, the assumption that it is two or even two million is ludicrous. Any calculation which gives the wrong value to God will be equally ludicrous in its conclusions. So, for instance, when it is said that the Chinese Republic is a "humbug" we cannot accept that statement until the ultimate question of the nature of God is answered.

If I accepted what I cannot but think many popular writers on China believe about God, and consequently about the universe in general, I should agree with their judgment on China and the Chinese, and on the relations between China and Britain. As it is, I find myself continually disagreeing with the view of God and the universe which is disclosed in their remarks about China. Many, however, who do not share these writers' views of God and the universe accept their judgments on China quite uncritically. If they stopped to ask on what fundamental conceptions about God and about life those judgments were based, they would

realize how greatly the judgments are influenced by fundamental conceptions which they do not themselves accept.

The issue is this—if these writers are correct in the fundamental assumptions without which most of their arguments fall to the ground, the world is a struggle in which practical achievement and power to control are the values for which life should be lived. If that is true, Jesus of Nazareth was wrong. If that is true, God is not what Jesus believed and taught, and the world is not what He understood it to be—a family in the making.

I have endeavoured to write as a Christian, believing profoundly that the omnipotence of the world's Creator is manifested most typically and essentially in the nailed impotence of the crucified Christ. That understanding of the ultimate nature of the universe turns the world, not upside down, as the Græco-Roman world believed, but right side up. It makes friendship and loyalty and the recognition of the rights of others to free expression of personality, of more value than life and security and property. It makes armed force the helpless thing it so continually shows itself to be, unless it is genuinely used, counting the cost, as the instrument of love. It makes national honour, the British flag, British prestige, and all the sacredness of those things, not what they mean to so many of us to-day when we pray "God, who made her mighty, make her mightier yet," but what they meant to Gladstone when he protested against the first Anglo-Chinese

war. Many people will regard this view as fundamentally unsound. They have a great volume of evidence on their side, and are justified in accepting it if their loyalty to truth requires it, in preference to the Christian contention. But I cannot do so—and the whole argument of this book is therefore based on the Christian conviction. It is the conviction about God and about life which has kept Christianity modern and the world young since the days before Britain was born. It is the conviction which has brought our democracy out of the chaos of the dark ages, and will bring it out of the cramping ordered-ness of this industrial era. It is the conviction which is to-day giving to men and women throughout the world courage and faith to face the world as it is, and power to work in it for the values for which they believe God created and sustains it.

The issue is not whether it is dangerous, or whether it is sound, but whether it is true. And the challenge of it to those who accept Christ is simply this —does what we regard as the truth about China square with what we believe to be the truth about God and the world His will supports? Does the policy we advocate in regard to China work for or against the things we believe that God cares for and works for, and is the method we would advocate His method?

The Christian minister has admittedly no more right than any other citizen to express his opinion on political or economic issues, and his opinion should

carry much less weight than that of those who are experts in politics and economics. But the ultimate premise of most political or economic judgments is theological. It is a conviction about the nature of things. And on that issue the Christian Church has a definite point of view which can legitimately claim to rank equally as the view of an expert. Political and economic experts have every right to challenge Christians with the statement that their experience does not tally with the Christian view of God and the world; but Christians have the same right to challenge economic or political judgments with the fundamental question, "What is your ultimate premise? What do you believe about God? If on other grounds you believe Christianity to contain the truth about God, must you not re-examine your economic and political judgments, and perhaps in the light of new evidence which Christianity affords about ultimate values, radically revise your economic and political views?"

But the concern of this book is not an exposition of the Christian view of God and the world. It is concerned with what follows from it in the relations between two countries—China and Britain. So much emphasis on the fundamental premise on which it is written is deliberate. It is intended to make it perfectly clear that there is no expectation that those who do not accept that premise should agree with judgments based on it as to what is important and what is unimportant, what is diseased and what is healthy, in Sino-British relations.

But it is expected that those who accept the Christian premise as to the nature of God and therefore of power and life values, will in the main accept the conclusions that follow from it. It is for them primarily that the book has been written. They do not, I believe, realize how much of what they allow, consciously or unconsciously, to form their opinions about China, is based on premises which they do not accept.

The whole question of the shooting on May 30th is an interesting example. An indirect reference was made to it some months afterwards by an experienced and successful Christian administrator. "The first business of an administration," he declared, "is to maintain order." If we accept the Christian view of the universe as the true view, can we accept that statement unquestioned? It depends on what is meant by administration. If it is meant to include all the functions of government it is an inadequate conception of the purpose for which government exists: for government, on the Christian view of the world, even government when it is in the hands of men who do not accept the Christian view of things, has as its first charge responsibility for the development of personality. Its concern for the maintenance of order is because order is not only an end in itself, but a means to the development of personality. If the Christian view is accepted as the basis of judgment the question is not settled by saying "order was maintained" or even "order had to be maintained." A further question has to

be asked—was the method employed for the maintenance of order unnecessarily prejudicial to the development of personality? Were the hatred and bitterness and racial passion that were aroused more prejudicial to the development of personality than damage to property, or even to life? Might not the death of a policeman have done more, even to preserve order, by winning the support of public opinion? I do not know. I only want to suggest that the question of the Shanghai shooting cannot be settled by reference to the maintenance of order, but only by reference to the more fundamental purpose for which order exists.

Christians cannot, I believe, accept judgments about China which put "order," or "commercial prosperity," or the security of British interests, even of British lives, before the other set of values which hinge around personality. On the Christian theory the universe is, however, rational, and the two are not ultimately incompatible. The policy of the Foreign Office has tended in recent months to approximate to what Christian idealists would hold to be the Christian policy in our relations with China. And during October a remarkable series of articles was published in the *Economist*[1] advocating for economic reasons what missionary leaders have advocated on the grounds of Christian faith and theory.

But those who hold the Christian view cannot expect those who do not accept the Christian premise to accept the Christian conclusion. Truth alone

[1] Issues of Oct. 16th, 23rd, and 30th, 1926.

matters. Honest holding to the views one honestly considers to be true is, on the Christian or any other view of the world, the central chord of life. Christians who believe others to be wrong in their beliefs about God and life cannot leave them there. They must challenge them and drive them furiously to think. And they must think furiously themselves. Even Christians must be as ready to accept their opponents' view if they find it true, as they expect others to be ready to accept the Christian view.

Under this same question of fundamentals or ultimate standards of judgment, and intimately connected with it, is another point of considerable importance in the relations between China and Britain. Our past, and to a large extent our present attitude to China, can be best characterized as "paternal." This is admirably summarized by Commander King-Hall:

> The British have behaved towards the Chinese in exactly the same way as they have behaved towards the many Orientals who grace their Empire. It is a kind of slightly conservative and paternal benevolence, coupled with the strict enforcement of a high standard of rectitude; as might be dealings between father and son.[1]

Many of us believe paternalism to be essentially a Christian attitude. I want to question this belief. The Christian attitude would be more nearly described by the word "interest," or perhaps better still by the words "concerned interest," especially if the word "interest" still carried its strict etymological

[1] *Western Civilization and the Far East*, p. 342.

meaning—"He is in the middle of it all." If that sense is added to the face meaning of the word "interest," some conception of what Christianity has to say about God's relation to the world is expressed. God's paternalism is, on the Christian view, the paternalism of the Cross. And that is so fundamentally contrary to the indulgent condescension which occupies so much of the popular meaning of paternalism that there is no room for both meanings inside the one word. After all that He had taught about the nature of the Fatherhood of God, Christ could only say, "If you want to know what I mean when I use the word Father in talking of God, you must look at Me and My life and My attitude." The word father, which was the only word available for use, was even in His speech inadequate to the description of God's attitude towards the world. It had to be expanded by inclusive reference to Himself and His life in such a way as to make it mean infinitely more than when it is used of ordinary human fatherhood.

If this is contrasted with the paternalism which characterizes our past and, to a large degree, our present attitude to China, it will reveal the fundamental weakness of that attitude—a weakness which it shares with that of far too many fathers in ordinary life. Paternalism as it is ordinarily understood is far too ready to decide what is good and what is bad for the object of its regard. Parents naturally know more than others about their children and what is best for them; but a parent who is convinced that he

knows all there is to know about his child has often put on blinkers. He tends to make no allowance for the unexpected. Is there not a greater degree of detachment in the ideal father? He recognizes more fully the child's need for freedom, and watches with interest and expectation the unfolding of that personality. Like the father of the prodigal in the New Testament parable he gives opportunities, and watches for results with a passionate and concerned interest—but with no effort to control.

Something of that kind must be God's attitude to China. From the Christian point of view it is our business to reflect, as far as we can, the attitude of God. We cannot give opportunities as He can and does; but we can watch with interest what China does with the opportunities that God gives her, and be ready to give such little help as we can when China asks for it. Christian paternalism is therefore practically identical with fraternalism. The reflection of true fatherhood becomes brotherhood. And this coincides with the Christian belief, that the fullest revelation of God's Fatherhood has been made "by our elder Brother, Jesus Christ."

Of course if Christianity is wrong about God, this book is wrong about our relations with China. It is, however, interesting to find an admirable statement of what, from the Christian view-point, I believe to be the true attitude of Britain to China in a review of two books on China published in the Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.[1] The books

[1] May 1926.

reviewed are Mr Rodney Gilbert's *What's Wrong with China*, and Mr Putnam Weale's *Why China sees Red.* The reviewer's attitude is perhaps a little more detached than the full Christian view-point, but if so, it errs on the right side. After all, the amazing thing about God is how little He interferes with His prodigal sons—whether in London or Peking.

The first half of the book deals with the civilization, language, history and ideals of China in a way which appeals to our common sense, but strikes us as being too occidentally objective to furnish a complete (or even an adequate) explanation. After all, the present ferment in China is primarily an internal revolution in the early stages of its development. Foreign relations are at times an irritant, and at times a stimulant; but the change itself (one of the great changes of the world's history) is inside China; it is proceeding in Chinese fashion, along Chinese lines, and in the Chinese *tempo.* It is almost useless to judge (however clearly) from Western standpoints; and it is quite useless to assert that our ways are better. It may be quite true, but it does not affect the situation. This "superiority" is the weakness of Mr Gilbert's book, and (to a less degree) of Mr Weale's book as well. Both authors are well qualified to perceive and analyse all the details of the problem; but to their sensible, business-like minds this problem is one of *organization.* Put in a good manager—a Strong Man—and this bankrupt China business can be pulled round to prosperity. Both writers hanker after a Napoleon, or even a Mussolini—and no wonder!

But we are inclined to think that the problem is not so much one of organization as of *growth.* The ambitions of individual men and the policies of individual nations need not be over-emphasized. The movement which we call "the awakening of China"

is developing its own forces, and will move to its appointed end—not necessarily towards improvement, or civilization, or wealth, or "progress." Like other great movements (the Reformation or the French Revolution), it is inconsequent, contradictory, wasteful, spasmodic. We "barbarians" are an outlying edge of this inundation; here and there we may be able to direct or deflect the course of some side-stream; but if we try to stand defiant in the midst of the main current (incompetent as we are even to locate its exact position) we shall only get a drenching for our pains.

"Judge not that ye be not judged" is, after all, not an accidental piece of good advice. It is based on an analysis of experience. It is we who are judged by the judgments we make. It was Pilate who was judged in the Prætorium. We are ourselves judged when we make an estimate of another people. As we look round from a British fireside, through British eyes, upon the other countries of the world, from France to Germany, from Italy to Russia, from South America to North America, it is easy to feel that Britain and the British Commonwealth alone preserve that poised and balanced combination of freedom and order which was the proud achievement of the Victorian age. But when we do so we are judging others in comparison with ourselves—not by their standards, or by independent standards, but by *our* standards, by the ideals which we have so far realized for our corporate life. Surely this is a fundamental mistake?

Is it not rather true that during the last century Britain achieved a state of comparative equilibrium

on the basis of the ballot box and the party system? These things seemed at the time to be the ideal government, and have been in a greater or less degree copied by many other nations. At the present time other methods are being tried out in the furnace of day-to-day government. Britain, as well as the other countries of the world, is casting round for some better way of realizing government of the people for the people by the people.

All countries are evolving—developing—growing. It may be for better, it may be for worse. That is not the point. What matters is that we have no right to judge them by the standards which we call "better" or "worse." Before we can judge them we must understand the particular genius and temperament and character of the country concerned. Our attitude should be one not of judgment but of interest: of interest not so detached as that with which we watch a play or a film drama, but approximating to that standard of detachment. It should be an attitude of interest in a living, not an acted, drama: and a drama whose end we cannot guess and certainly cannot determine by what we consider that its end, or even the direction of its development, should be.

Another mistake of popular opinion in regard to other countries, which is a corollary of egocentric judgment, deserves notice. It is of fundamental importance because of its influence on our attitude. A man who "likes" the Germans has as a rule "not much use for" the French. A man who "likes"

the Turks has "not much use for" the Armenians. And the reverse is true, of course, of the man who "likes" the Armenians or the French. This habit of liking or disliking is particularly common in western opinion as between the Chinese and the Japanese. The champions of Japan have "not much use for" the Chinese and Koreans—the champions of China or Korea seem almost inevitably to disparage Japan. I do not recall meeting either in Britain or the East a single person who is not in one way or another influenced by a naïve like or dislike of this kind for one nation or another. In many cases this bias has been due to some chance acquaintance, or to some pleasant or unpleasant personal experience; but far more commonly it is due to a chance stirring of popular imagination by some public event, or by newspaper propaganda.

This common and dangerously powerful mental bias appears to be an unthinking relic of childhood, which "likes" Mummy better than Daddy, or Nurse better than Aunt Joan. There is often, of course, a good deal of sound instinct in a child's likes or dislikes. But in such cases it is nearly always all children who like or dislike a certain person. This is not the case in our attitude to countries. Even if all Englishmen like, say, Turks better than Armenians, all people everywhere do not do so; nor is it true even of Englishmen that we are united in our national likes and dislikes. It is always an individual or at least a sectional matter. We must therefore conclude that liking and disliking as attitudes towards

a country are both unreasonable and illegitimate. When a man is asked if he likes the Chinese better than the Japanese, or the French better than the Germans, or Canadians better than citizens of the United States, he can at best only think of individuals whom he knows in each country, and of the general impression the country as a whole has left on his mind. Probably if he is honest he can only reply that he finds them all intensely interesting (and, he must admit, sometimes intensely annoying), but that he cannot honestly use the word "like" of any of them. They all have a right to their own ideas and methods and place in the sun, and his business, as he understands it, is to accept them for what they are and endeavour to understand what they are after.

In desiring, therefore, that we should have as a nation a certain attitude towards China, there is not the least intention to suggest that this should be an exclusive attitude, which puts China on a pedestal and all other countries in the dock. I do not ask you to "like" China—I ask you to be interested in her. I am suggesting an attitude of interest and desire to understand which is not based on sentiment or emotion, but on the will and the reason. To do anything else is surely to relapse into an unreasoning survival of our childhood days.

This attitude of interest, though based in my own thought on my Christian convictions, is one which I hope many who do not accept the Christian view

will accept as the right attitude of mind for all our thought and action in regard to China.

One further important fundamental remains to be noticed. Those who accept the Christian view of God are not in a position to be able to judge or to condemn. They can, however, looking at all the conflicting and confusing events that are going on in China, say with some measure of certainty and conviction—this, or that, seems to us to have some root of permanence or of good in it, because it is with and not against the grain of the universe and the mind and purpose of its Creator.

In the next chapter an attempt will be made to suggest what are the significant trends in the life of the China with which we are to-day in contact. They are not the only things that are going on. They are not the strongest or necessarily the most far-reaching influences, but I believe them to be what matter for the present and for the future.

The basis of selection is not the experience of many years in China, which I have not had. Nor is it the experience only of the few months in which I enjoyed the intimate friendship of outstanding Chinese citizens. My basis is rather my belief about God and the nature of the world He has made. It is the same belief that makes me attach more importance to the life of Christ than to all the evil that ever has been, or will be, perpetrated by man or devil. I believe personalities and movements which are animated in any sense by values and

ideals approximating to the values and ideals of Christ will survive, and that personalities and movements of which this cannot be said contain in themselves the germ of their own decay. They must in the end be overcome by the good.

CHAPTER VIII

SIGNIFICANT TRENDS

THE experience which thrilled the soul of Cortez when he first sighted the Pacific seems commonplace beside the experience of Noah as he saw, presumably, first one and then another tiny island peak emerge. Week after week went by and those tiny islands became vast mountains. A whole world stolen from mankind by the great waters became again coherent: valleys and hills and plains became once more connected and intelligible.

China has been flooded by a new experience—a whole world of thought and practice and achievement utterly foreign to her own genius has flooded in upon her, overlaying not only what was weak, but for a time, at any rate, what was strong in her old culture and civilization. To-day the waters of chaos appear to rage furiously together. Pessimism, and all the facile, futile remedies of pessimism and despair, are bandied about by many foreigners and still more Chinese

There is amongst observers profound disagreement on the vital question: Are there island points which tell of solid ground beneath? Disagreement reaches even to the question where to look for land, and as to what land looks like. This chapter will

take up the search for land, and the examination of any that may be found. To do so is possible only if the conclusions of the previous chapter are accepted. There must be agreement as to what land is. In this case the land must be the same land that was there before the flood. It must be Tai-Shan and the Altar of Heaven, and not, say, the Woolworth building or St Paul's Cathedral. Those who hope for the latter are looking for what they cannot expect to find.

But the flood analogy is as bad as most analogies. If it carries comprehension in one pocket, it carries confusion in the other. For the first thing that appears, as one begins the search, is life—living people carrying on. The flood cannot have been a real flood: life has not been wiped out by it; the chaos of its raging waters must have had about them more appearance than reality.

It is difficult in these days of vivid imagination, attended by every conceivable means of satisfying its unnatural appetite, to realize how little any country is affected fundamentally by chaos. It was impossible for us in the war days to get those who were not in it to see the horrors of trench warfare in their right proportions. Fortunately men must eat and provide shelter for themselves and, as in the war, so in any country said to be in chaos, those elemental activities go on. Comfort may go and security may go, but comfort and security are the parents of imagination. Those who are living in the chaos of China are less aware in some ways than

the imaginative onlooker of the horrors of their situation. Life to them is often vital and full and rich in combating as best they can those very horrors which curdle our imagination and swell the circulation of our newspapers. That is, of course, not by any means to say that horrors are not horrors, or that every effort should not be made to make them less horrible. Nor is it intended to suggest that China is in a state comparable to the horrors of war as it was known in Europe. It is necessary, however, to make clear the part played by our imaginations before any true conception of China's life to-day can be obtained. The average educated Chinese in Shanghai would be half amused, half angry, if he could see day by day the references to China in the London Press. The average Chinese countryman would not believe that they referred to China at all. For China goes on—marrying and burying, sowing and reaping, buying and selling, and all the many busy-nesses of everyday living occupy the minds and energies of the vast majority.

The flood of western thought is not then in every sense a flood. It does not drown. It is a life influence acting on life. It is, or has been, a flood mainly in this way—that it has flooded men's eyesight and insight so that they could see nothing else. Western writers have talked about New China as if she were a new housemaid having no connection with the old except that she occupies the same place in the household. Nearly all that is essentially China has been obscured by the modern trappings which China has

been trying out. In port cities, where most of our contacts have been, we have imagined that New China reigns; we have failed to see the essential Old China at the heart of the New, and have therefore failed in our judgment, failed because we have used wrong standards. We have judged by the standards of our civilization, which we imagine New China to be copying. But she is not copying—she is experimenting—trying out. Her heart and soul are not in it. She is like an experienced batsman handling new bats in a shop—not as he is some months later, when he wields his choice with the confidence of tried friendship and mutual understanding.

That is not, of course, to deny that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Chinese are copying—are not living their own life, but trying to copy ours. The result is as unconvincing as that of the foreigner who tries to copy Chinese habits and customs. Hundreds more, however—scattered in little groups throughout the country—have won through to the confidence of a tried and accepted life habit. They have woven what they want of western culture into the fabric of their own habitual conduct, and are quietly engaged in the business of citizenship and family life. Those scattered groups are what matter. They are the real island points that tell of land beneath. The rest—all the unbalanced, noisy effervescence of treaty port life—are but flotsam and jetsam, the wreckage of the flood floating on the water. The quiet, unnoticed groups are the significant element in China to-day. China's strength

has always been in her family life, in the untiring busyness of her men and women about the little things that really count. Her greatest teacher was, after all, the prophet of the everyday. He revealed the profound significance of the commonplace. No one can understand what is happening in China to-day, what is emerging from the flood, unless he can appreciate the value of commonplace living. To have shared the daily life of those Chinese whose family life is at once new and essentially old is to feel the China that is, and is coming to be, because she always has been. It is a China that is in less chaos even to-day than our apparently stable West, because what she worships, what she lives by, what she knows in her bones, is the value of the simple arts of everyday living with family and neighbours.

Surface observers, scanning China from club windows, or from the indolent aloofness of the house-boat and the traveller's chair, see the surface things and speak truly of them. They see the chaos of the towns, the oppression of the villagers, and solid worth betrayed by selfishness and greed. In no unmeasured terms they rate the officials, and the politicians, and the seeming crazy students, and the whole military mad *ménage* which clusters round the railways and the rivers. Those things are there in the foreground. These observers report what they see. No wonder they despair. "Militarism," they report, "is rapidly increasing—more and more men under arms, more and more trade areas blighted by war,

more and more merchants ruined by military taxes. The new foreign-trained officials appear as corrupt as the old, and a great deal more incompetent. The new tide of thought is broken on the sands of the futility of half-baked learning. The students themselves are being duped by paid agitators. The university authorities are quite unable to control them and, apparently, are not particularly troubling to do so. Strikes are on the increase for petty causes, and are becoming so frequent that means of increasing wages and improving conditions are absorbed in the struggle to keep the industry going. And faced with all this, China is wasting her energy and time and breath in endeavouring to drive out the foreigners who alone are capable of preserving little corners of order and stability, instead of devoting her energies to the reform of her own domestic abuses under the enlightened leadership and skilled advice of the West."

All those things are true, and no sane Chinese attempts to deny them. But he does not get excited about them as we do. And the reason seems to be, not that he cares less, but that he cares more and understands better. If that were the state of Britain there would indeed be cause for despair. The diseases described would be in the vital organs of our body politic. Our civilization has been built up on highly organized trade and highly organized industry. China's civilization—China's life as a people—is almost entirely independent of those things. And because China is independent of them,

she can weather storms which batter her indeed but which would wreck Britain.

If there were any widespread weakening in her family loyalty, there would indeed be cause for alarm. The family is, of course, threatened where it is in touch with Western civilization, as all that is morally worth while in our own country is threatened by the diseases of an age of mechanical prosperity. There is widespread modification of the family system, but, if anything, a strengthening rather than a weakening of the fundamental hold that the family at its best has upon Chinese life. The emperor was in a sense the keystone of the arch of China's family system. It is possible to hold that the Revolution and the new republican ideas, in removing this keystone, have begun the pulling down of the arch. I do not myself believe this to be the case. Authority, which the emperor represented, whether in state or family, is powerless unless it can win and hold the response of loyalty. Family authority is less strong than it was, but family loyalty shows signs of growing stronger. Loyalty to the republic and loyalty to the family fellowship are taking the place of the old submission to authority.

The small family system of the West is being introduced by all those who have experienced the freedom and scope that it brings with it. But the fact that they live in homes of their own, apart from their parents, has not diminished their respect and reverence and genuine caring for the aged. It has

rather deepened the age-long family feeling by taking out of it the element of compulsion that has been in the past an integral part of the bond. I heard a most remarkable woman, the leader of the Christian women students in Peking, publicly advocating the retention, for a time at any rate, of the old custom by which marriages are arranged by parents. Her contention was that the personal sacrifice which this entailed was nothing compared to the stability of social life that would be secured by it. "Our parents, after all," she said in Chinese, "are less likely than we are to be misled by passing emotions." Even the most extravagantly westernized Chinese are unable to escape altogether the restraining influence of this traditional conception. There lingers still a deep respect for parents. Their consciences will not leave them alone if they trample unnecessarily upon it.

Admittedly the worst feature of Chinese life at the present time is the growing virulence of the military epidemic. To urge that the horrors of militarism are local and intermittent does not in the least minimize the serious nature of the disease. It is becoming more serious and more virulent, but less mad, less wanton, less selfish than it has been. At the close of 1925, fourteen years after the outbreak of the Revolution, it seemed as though China must relapse into feudalism, and so perhaps in the remote future work through to a Chinese United States. The Republic which the Revolution achieved in idea, seemed destined to go through many wilderness years

before it could be realized in practice. But at that time the significance of what was happening in Canton was not apparent.

To call the recent fighting a struggle between North and South is as misleading as it would be to call the Civil War in England a war between North and South. In happened in England through geographical and other causes that Royalist sentiment was strongest in the North and West. For similar reasons, Republican sentiment has in China in the past been strongest, and better able to express itself in political organization, in Canton than in the central and northern provinces. The reason is partly temperamental. The Cantonese have always been a quick, progressive people. And the contact they have had with the republican and democratic ideas of the West is also a contributing cause. For these and other reasons the republican idea has been based on Canton. But it has only been based there. The government in Canton was not a Cantonese government. It has been for some time a National Republican government claiming to be the government of China, and the true expression of the spirit of the 1911 Revolution. General Chiang Kai Sheh, the commander-in-chief, and many others, are natives of other parts of China.

In some senses it is true to say that the Revolution is only now beginning. In 1911 the Manchu dynasty failed to control the revolutionary idea. Yuan Shih Kai, the Kitchener of China, recalled from disfavour to quell the outburst, discovered its

strength as an idea. He knew that the Manchu dynasty was not strong enough to resist this idea, and so he compromised with the republicans and became himself the first President of the Republic. But he was not a republican at heart, he was a monarchist. Like Henry VIII he could only be an autocrat. Consequently he was continually at odds with the forms of republican government, with the Parliament and Cabinet, to which as President he was responsible. He endeavoured to follow the only logical course and establish a new dynasty. He, if any man, should have been able to do this, but he found the republican idea too strong even for him.

The notorious "War Lords" of the present time are the survivors of the captains and colonels and generals of the Imperial Armies of which Yuan Shih Kai was in command. Like him they are not republicans at heart. They do not understand republican government. China, if it were left to them, could only relapse into feudalism. Their conception of life and government is one familiar to English history in the times of the Barons. George Bernard Shaw tilting in Chevy Chase against "the stout Earl of Northumberland" allied with his traditional foe, the Black Douglas, would be as good a picture as any of the present struggle, so fundamentally different is the idealism of Sun Yat Sen—the creed, almost the religion, of the southern armies—from the method and outlook of the "War Lords." It is interesting to notice that General Chiang Kai

Sheh, the southern military commander, insists on remaining the servant of the republican government. Because of his immense prestige he is succeeding perhaps no better than Cromwell did; but there is this difference between them, that he is a soldier rather than a statesman. Control of statesmanship remains in the hands of the government group.

Russian influence is difficult to estimate and easily exaggerated. One or two facts often overlooked are significant. The present government, including its Commander-in-Chief in the field, is opposed to Communism as desperately as is Mr Ramsay Macdonald. The Communist party, if it could, would turn them out of power. Another fact of equal importance is that the republican government itself and the republican movement generally are in the control of the bourgeoisie.

If the conditions that existed in Russia, and for that matter in France, had obtained in China, the Revolution of 1911 would have been as terrible a thing as the Russian and the French Revolutions. Because those conditions did not exist, the revolutionary leaders had no mob violence to help them to establish control. The significance of the republican movement at the present time is the development of the disciplined equivalent of the mob violence of a revolution—citizen armies, armies animated by the republican idea. These armies have been recently accompanied by mob violence, but do not depend upon it. And it is quite clear that the

Chinese dislike and distrust this element of mob violence which the Russians regard as a useful weapon.

Feng Yu Hsiang and his army of Ironsides fit into neither category. Historically Marshal Feng is one of the Barons. He finds the same, though not as much, difficulty as they in understanding democratic government. But his army is also a legitimate citizen army, not only in name, but in practice. This was the fundamental reason for his break with Wu Pei-fu. He would not—though he was ordered to do so—live on the country. His strength, in consequence, lies in the popularity of his army—a popularity which is very well deserved indeed. He is now in official alliance with the republican army of the South and has joined the Kuo Min Tang—the republican party. The ideals of the two groups are so much alike that this was inevitable, even if their common dependence upon Russia for military supplies had not hastened it.

It may be some years before these essentially republican forces can control China. It is interesting that they must move in the end from the West eastwards, and not as in every previous attempt from the East westwards. Strategically, this is probably of very great advantage. But ultimately their success will not depend on strategic positions or on military power. It will depend on the will of the people. The "War Lords" are hated. If these republican soldiers and generals can remain true to their ideals, they will indeed be the people's army and will be

hailed as deliverers wherever they go. At present, the merchants rather naturally mistrust the Russian influence. If the republicans are using Russia they will succeed; if Russia is using them they will fail. And the hope of freedom from baronial oppression will be once more indefinitely postponed.

It would be unwise to suggest that as far as the curse of militarism is concerned, what we are now witnessing is the darkest hour before the dawn. There is not enough evidence as to the strength of republican conviction in those who are now so readily joining the republican forces. But the progress and spirit of the republican forces is at least significant for the future, even if several years must elapse before a working unity of control is established throughout the country.

There is another significant trend, connected with the new military situation, which is beginning to show itself in the political sphere. In the years immediately following the Boxer rising an attempt was made by the Manchu dynasty to inaugurate a western method of parliamentary and constitutional government. The existing paper constitution of the Chinese Republic is, in effect though not in fact, a direct continuation of this attempt. This copied constitution has never worked. It is entirely discontinuous with China's past development, and rests on the western idea that the business of a government is to govern rather than on the Chinese idea that the business of a government is to let people govern themselves, or, perhaps better, to

make it possible for people to live their own lives.

Some of the corruption that has accompanied the new system is due to this essential discontinuity with Chinese life as a whole. It is not a real expression of the mind and habits of her people, and does not fit on to the rest of her organized social life. Politicians have been detached adventurers, rather than the recognized leaders of the district they have represented.

In the republican government at the present time a different process is emerging, a new conception of government method. On the surface it appears to be a direct descendant of the old imperial administrative order. But a far-reaching modification has been introduced: the principle of shared responsibility. Every minister has colleagues associated with him. He is the chairman and executive officer of a committee of three or more. The other members are in the main other ministers with portfolios of their own shared in the same way. Every minister is then the chairman of his own committee and the member of two or three more. This has a dual advantage. It makes the minister less of an autocrat, and keeps him more in touch with public sentiment.

The disease of political corruption in China is caused mainly by her strong family feeling. It seems unlikely that the strength of this family-centric morality will be weakened by the modifications it is undergoing, and it will have to be countered

by a positive public morality which will be strong enough to resist individual weakness. The system of shared responsibility will do a great deal. But some more positive morality is necessary. It is claimed that there are signs that this also has been achieved by the republican government. Very probably this claim is justified, but there is not yet sufficient evidence for a definite opinion one way or the other.

It is also possible that the idealism of Sun Yat Sen, actualized in the programme of the republican party, will prove to be a genuine Chinese political development, influenced, of course, by political theory and development of other countries, but strained through thoroughly Chinese minds. If so, here is another sign of the direction in which the Chinese people are working out their own particular ethos. The world at large and many Chinese have been looking for years for the strong man who would unify China by force. It may well be that China's strong man will prove to be a weak man—and that weak man dead. For Sun Yat Sen was, in the sense that strength is used in talking of a "strong man," essentially a weak man. While he lived he was a dreamer of dreams, whose dreams were taken for madness. But now that he is gone and his successive dreams can no longer confuse, irritate and embarrass his followers, the dreams, passing through more practical minds than his, may give China a unity of thought and idea, and so of political expression. Certainly Sun-Yat-Sen-ism is the popular religion of China to-day. If a man wants to sell watches, he puts Sun Yat Sen's picture on them. In discussing with students, even in Peking and in Manchuria, what Christians mean by claiming that Christ is living and working with them to-day, invariably they quoted as a parallel that Sun Yat Sen's spirit is alive in China to-day, and would often agree only to a similar mode of action by the spirit of Christ. In March 1926 the official work of government offices in Canton began each week with a service of commemoration and dedication before the photograph of Sun Yat Sen, and every minister had in his office a photograph and a facsimile of his Will, and perhaps a bust.

Sun Yat Sen himself complained again and again in his lifetime that he could not get the spirit of reckless idealism into his followers. His son, Sun Fo, the Home Secretary of the republican government, can now say that the strength of the party lies in its idealism. What men of force have not been able to do, this man of dreams is rapidly doing. They could not secure the obedience and submission of their followers. He has captured their imaginations. Christians will be glad, though not surprised, to know that, like Mr Gandhi in India, he owed this remarkable power, in a large measure, to what Christ had done to supplement the old religious heritage of his people.

It is interesting to notice that the republican government is not an elected government. Its authority is Sun Yat Sen's Will. It was created by

the Kuo Min Tang National Congress held in Canton in January 1926. The Kuo Min Tang is a political party now organized on the basis of the Will. In as far as this party is the only existing political party in China of any size or influence, the Nationalist government can fairly claim to represent China better than any other group now in the country. The " War Lord " group opposed to them depends for its position not on a party or a programme but on military strength.

The burden of a long tradition of officialdom, based not on service but on possibility of profit and the petty satisfaction of wielding arbitrary power, is perhaps the most insidious disease that remains as a legacy of the long period of Manchu decay. One of the reasons for the inefficient management of the district of Chapei, the semi-modern city that adjoins Shanghai, is the continual struggle between the merchants and the officials. The wealth and comparative prosperity of the city are due to the labours of the merchants. The management of the city is technically in the hands of the officials. Having no stake in municipal prosperity, except their own reputation, which no longer matters in the way that it did when the Manchus were at their best and supervision was a reality, the officials are far too often preoccupied with the great opportunities that a semi-modern city gives them for personal profit. The merchants, not unnaturally, are anxious, for much more legitimate reasons, to keep the management of municipal affairs in their own hands.

Cross-purposes and inefficiency are therefore the order of the day. Readers of the life of Abraham Lincoln previously unaccustomed to the working of the American political machine are naturally surprised to find him appointing village postmasters and other petty officials. This type of appointment (though in China not that of the postmasters) remains in the hands of the governors, who are still mostly of the same mind as before the Revolution. They, too, are strangers to the republican spirit.

Is it possible to see changes taking place which will bring the republican spirit and idea into the realm of local as well as of national and provincial government ? Analogy only illuminates when its limits are clearly understood. The analogy of European political development has this serious limitation when it is applied to China, that past practice, present custom and conditions, and social organization, are all different. But it is useful at the present time to recall the influence exerted in European political development and local government by the merchants, the burghers of the free towns and walled cities, who could defy with relative impunity barons and even kings. Many of our civic customs are relics of that defiance. In China to-day, the Chambers of Commerce have an outstanding influence. The opponents of corrupt officialdom in Chapei are for the most part men of influence in the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. The best of the younger generation are looking for careers in commerce and in education, rather than

in official life. Commercial and educational circles are in the main enlightened and public spirited and are tapping sources of new life and development. Corrupt officials are a survival of the past. Much will depend on whether they or the commercial and educational circles gain the upper hand in the struggle that has already begun between them.

The ideal of the past in China was that the reward of the scholar should be the opportunity to govern. There are signs that the products of the modern educational system are becoming increasingly concerned with government not as a reward but as a responsibility. And this is true of those engaged in university work as well as of those in commerce. Chaos in the educational world is one side of the picture. But there is another side.

The students who led the first Student Movement of May 4th, 1915—and so saved Shantung from falling under Japanese control—are now, many of them, in positions of influence and responsibility, as professors and deans and even presidents of universities of which they were then students. A significant and successful move took place in Shanghai in the early months of 1926, in preparation for the coming of May with its many anniversaries—May 1st Labour Day, May 4th the first Student Movement, May 9th National Humiliation Day (the signing of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915) and, as a grand finale, May 30th. University and staff members were plainly in a very difficult position. China's greatest need, as they see it, is for a complete reck-

lessness of self-giving in public service. The last thing therefore they desired to do was to damp the patriotic ardour of their students. Their generation had initiated the patriotic strike and demonstration. Attempts to suppress similar activities carried on by their own students would lead to misunderstanding and resentment and probably throw the students into the arms of Communist agitators. Two things were evidently essential. They must secure the leadership and hold the confidence of the students. And some outlet other than the strike and the demonstration must be found for the expression and development of patriotic ardour. Both these essentials have in a measure been secured by the formation of a University Patriotic Association controlled by staff members with some student co-operation.

Two examples of what this association was able to do will illustrate their methods and their potential influence. On May 9th, National Humiliation Day, the college authorities themselves arranged patriotic meetings with outside speakers, often from other colleges in the city, the main emphasis of the meetings being positive patriotic service. About the same time an essay competition was announced on "The Best Methods of Boycotting British Goods." The prize was reported in the foreign Press as $500 (£50). The whole scheme appeared much less sinister when it became known that the prize was only $5 (10s.) The object was to take the boycott from the streets into the study and the debating hall.

It is impossible to forecast how this tendency will develop; and difficult even now to estimate its success. It is, however, plainly better that students should learn their patriotism and their politics in their class-rooms and not in the streets, and better that they should be led by the responsible university authorities than by irresponsible outsiders with ulterior motives. Movements of similar significance but of smaller scale have been spontaneous student organizations, such as the "Back to the School Movement" and others with similar titles, which have stood out resolutely in the colleges against the more noisy element.

Another movement of great importance is the citizenship training work of the Y.M.C.A. Its object is to convert "national hatred into civic spirit." It has made the week in May which includes May 4th and May 9th an annual Citizenship Training Week, in which it concentrates, through lectures, demonstrations and discussion classes, on positive activities of national public spirit, such as internal peace, mass education, the abolition of opium smoking, thrift, industrial welfare, and public health. When it is remembered that the Chinese Y.M.C.A. has a position relative to the combined influence of C.O.P.E.C. and the University Settlement movement in Britain, it will be recognized that this is no small constructive force.

In the same connection the mass education work now being carried out with such remarkable enthusiasm and success under the leadership of its first

pioneer—Dr James Yen—is of great significance for the future. No fewer than two million Chinese men, women, and children have already graduated in the schools organized by this movement in the years since the war. One thousand of the Chinese characters most commonly used have been selected as foundation characters. Illiterates have been formed into classes lasting for one-and-a-half to two hours daily for four months. Twelve hundred men and boys, of ages ranging from six to forty-two, attended the first experimental course, and of these nine hundred and sixty-seven graduated. The movement has met with a similar success in the twenty provinces where it has been initiated. The majority of the teachers are voluntary workers. Those who master the thousand foundation characters are able to write simple business letters, keep accounts, and read simple literature.

Experiments are now being made as to how best to help on to full literacy those who show sufficient ability and interest. The ability to read will open up the rich storehouse of China's past to the mass of her people. The great moral traditions of China, betrayed by the corrupt officials of the last century, will come as new life and new light to those who have only before been able to see the corrupt actions of the betrayers. The technical skill of the West which is making mass education possible will not only bring a measure of western knowledge to the China of the coming generations but will open up for them the rich storehouse of their own past.

I am told by those in the closest touch with Chinese education that there is to-day a marked tendency to revert to the traditional Chinese emphasis in education. That emphasis is essentially a moral emphasis. Science, technology, even military skill, are all being taught on western lines. But, I am told, the old fundamental Chinese conception of education is winning through; its essential spirit has always been non-utilitarian. One does not go to the Sermon on the Mount for support of claims as to the British point of view on anything. But in this case it is legitimate to quote the *Doctrine of the Mean*: "What Heaven has conferred is called Nature; our accordance with this Nature is called the Path of Duty; the regulation of this Path is called Instruction." The soul of China speaks in those words. Slowly but surely she is returning to her first love. She will adapt some elements of our educational material and methods to her own use. But she will remain faithful to her own educational objective—essentially a moral objective.

In the development of industry in China there are two distinct trends:

(*a*) There is the denationalized trend. Its dominant feature is the use of western industrial methods as a means of making money. In treaty port districts and in the vicinity of the main communication arteries, this group is relatively important. It is creating the dissatisfied proletariat which has proved

so fruitful a cause of friction in the last two years. This trend includes foreign industrial enterprise. But foreign industrial enterprise is only significant inasmuch as it is being imitated and multiplied by this particular Chinese type. The industrialization of China can only come through Chinese industrialists.

(*b*) But there is also a profoundly Chinese trend finding expression through Chinese leaders entirely, many of them educated in the United States, but not denationalized. Their approach to the industrial problem is not "Where can we best establish a cotton mill?" but "What possible ways are there of saving China from the mistakes made by the western industrial revolution? What is there now existing in Chinese industrial life which can be adapted and developed in such a way as to secure the advantages of modern machinery without its disadvantages?"

The most recent action of the Board which administers the American Indemnity Funds, of whom the majority are Chinese, has been the establishment of a Department of Social Research. It proposes to study (1) A domestic handicraft or home industry, (2) Rural living conditions, (3) A modern industry. It is significant that if it proves impossible for these researches to be made concurrently, the study of a domestic handicraft or home industry is to be first undertaken.

The relative influence of these two trends—roughly, of factory versus home industry—is at

present overwhelmingly on the side of the wholesale introduction of western factory-organized industry. So far, the only achievement of the home industry movement has been successful competition with Japanese towel factories. Small towels, dipped in boiling water and wrung out, are very commonly used as we use washing-basins and table napkins. There is therefore a wide market for them, which, owing to the introduction of a convenient machine which can be readily used in houses, is being mainly supplied by home-made towels. Whether or not the unique strength of China's home organization and home feeling will be successful in modifying the factory system, it is impossible to say. But this is certain, that the idealists, religious and social, who in Britain would be absorbed in welfare work or in the labour movement, are in China mainly concerned with the development of home industries. The case of Mr Haung Yen Pei is a conspicuous example. He has three times refused Cabinet office in order to continue and develop his work for vocational education, with the direct object of stimulating home industries.

The change in name and in objective of the industrial committee of the China Christian Council also reflects this significant trend in Chinese industrial development. It is now a "Committee on Christianizing Economic Relations" (a much neater title in the original Chinese). Its efforts will now be directed towards making "everyday economic relations truly Christian." These relations are described as including "relations between master or mistress and domestic servant, between master and apprentice, between employer and industriál worker, between buyer and seller."

This is the natural expression of a feeling that modern industry does not really affect the heart of Chinese life. Indeed, lack of interest in the achievements of factory-organized industry is probably the strongest ground for hoping that China will not be industrialized as Japan has been. If, however, this lack of interest is due to a refusal to face a problem —which, though existing only in relatively few localities, bristles with difficulties—the industrial outlook is alarming in the extreme. I do not, however, believe this to be the case.

It is difficult for a Christian whose contacts with Chinese life have been in the main contacts with young Chinese Christians to estimate the significance for the future of what Chinese Christians are doing because they are Christians. For instance the quiet, devoted, and numerically successful work of Roman Catholic missionary endeavour has reached already two million people. Roman policy is quite deliberately directed towards the building of stable Christian character in second and third generation Christians, rather than to make the weight of influence of the Christian community count directly in public and social life at the present time. But those who have experienced the power of simple Christian living by ordinary everyday people will realize that there is in those two million adherents

of Roman Catholic Christianity a force of tremendous potentiality for the future.

Non-Roman Christians are numerically about one-third of the Roman Christian community, but their direct influence on public life is very much greater. The mass education movement was initiated and is still largely inspired and carried on by members of this community. The National Anti-Opium Association, originally organized by Christians, is now again dependent entirely upon them for its continued existence, and for its dogged and faithful work. And in national, political, educational, and industrial life there is a remarkable proportion of men of outstanding quality and character and ability who are Christians, and who plainly owe to Christianity that something which makes them outstanding.

But it is not in achievement that the Chinese Christian fellowship is significant, but in its possibilities. The possibilities of the quiet deliberate steady policy of the Roman Catholic Christians in the humdrum business of everyday life are obvious. The particular genius of the smaller non-Roman community shows signs of manifesting itself in addition by playing a very important part in public life. The China Christian Council at its last meeting was symptomatic of this spirit. It was determined to attempt the difficult task of permeating the various national movements of China with the Christian spirit. This determination has an obvious significance not only for the republican movement, and for educational

and industrial movements in China, but for the whole business of Sino-foreign relations.

In the republican movement there are signs that Nationalism is getting some of its cutting edge from a deliberate stimulation of anti-foreign feeling and of class hatred—though the latter is not really being successful except where it coincides with anti-foreign feeling. Christian leaders, though suspected as "denationalized" or "unpatriotic," are throwing themselves right across this movement and standing courageously for a nationalism based on service and devotion to the needs of China, and for an internationalism in which nationalism will play its own essential part.

British people who do not realize the natural feelings of Chinese Christians as citizens of their country are alarmed at the tendency to interfere (they consider it interference) in politics. They see only that Christian leaders are taking their stand definitely on the nationalist platform and insisting that Sino-foreign relations should be "in the spirit of Christ." They do not fully recognize that though this means an alteration of the present system in China's favour, it means an alteration secured by co-operation and discussion and mutual give and take instead of by mob violence or boycott.

But the application of this spirit in this way to the present situation gives immense promise for the future. There is, as it were, a bridge between China and Britain. Christians of both countries who are united in the fellowship of a common faith, a common

spirit and a common service, constitute a bond between the two peoples of incalculable possibilities.

What I have written is not the whole story about China. The many books that have been written have not told, and cannot tell, the whole story. I have tried only to pick out some of the trends in Chinese life which are most significant. They are some of the things that are most dear to the hearts of many Chinese men and women.

These forces and the people behind them are the allies of the Christian Church in China—many Christian men and women are giving through them expression to the enthusiasm and vitality which have come to them through finding in Christ the meaning of life, and God Himself. Increasing life and power and vitality will flow into China through the Christian Church as it links itself on through its members more and more closely with what God has done in the past in China—in religion, in home life, in education, and in social organization.

For there is no such thing as New China or Old China. This people, with whom we British people have such inadequate contacts, are still essentially Chinese. They are the same people who made Chinese culture and were made by it. They will go on making it and being made by it. Their continued vitality is demonstrated in the new emphases they are developing. But the new emphases will all in the end prove to be Chinese emphases. It will be China with whom we shall have our dealings, not a

mere copy or adaptation of ourselves. But a China whose people need be no more mysterious to us than we need be to them. Different from us, of course—in many ways fundamentally different—but just because so different intensely interesting.

Let us then accept China as a fact, as she accepts us. And let us examine eagerly what she has learned about life and about society, as she is examining eagerly what we have learned. As we learn in this way to know each other better as peoples, what is now diseased in our relations will gradually be healed.

EPILOGUE

THE FUTURE

My plan was to leave you there—in the presence of that China with whom Britain will have her dealings in the future.

But the friends at whose behest I write say No. The average reader, they tell me, unlike the average writer, is stupid. You, of course, are not the average reader as I am not the average writer. But you probably feel in a quandary about this China business—the what-can-one-do ? quandary.

In the first place—Do nothing.

In the second place—Be different.

Right doing always boils over from right being. As a nation we must *be* different before it will even become apparent what things we can *do* differently. We will become different as a nation, only a little different, but still different, if all who have been patient enough to read as far as this last chapter decide for the future to be interested in China and the Chinese—not biased, nor partisan, nor curious, nor opinionated, nor resentful, nor patronising; not pessimistic, not optimistic; neither liking the Chinese, nor disliking the Chinese, neither afraid of the Yellow Peril nor fanatical about the golden possibilities of the Celestial Republic; in fact, none

of the varied things that we are or are not at the moment, but *interested*—interested in a great group of human beings going through a remarkable period of growth.

This is not a matter for governments only nor for Far Eastern traders, nor for missionaries, but for the man who reads his evening paper every night by his own fireside or in the bar-parlour. The people of China and the people of Britain, the every-day people, have for each other a profound respect and a deep ineradicable sympathy. Existing points of contact between them are at present inadequate. Once the people of Britain determine to develop this deep underlying respect and sympathy into genuine interest in China, all this will be changed. Like a swollen river bursting its banks and finding new channels for its waters, the British people will find new ways of contact with the Chinese people. Business men, educationists, artistic and literary folk will determine to know more about the real China, and, being determined, they will find new ways. Business men will not rest content with existing channels and methods of trade between the two countries; educationists will seek to know the secret of China's monumental educational achievements in the past; and literary folk, banning for ever the facile device which ekes out a poor plot by the spice of mandarin mystery, will seek to know and write about the true human nature and human culture of the Chinese people.

So much for ourselves.

What shall we demand of the "powers that be" in this matter of Sino-British relations?

I would suggest that we insist that the press no longer terrifies old ladies, whose dearest belongings live in Chinese Treaty Ports, by blood-curdling posters prophesying immediate massacre; and that we demand of press correspondents not club gossip or amateur statesmanship, but real insight into Chinese minds, insight not into the minds of those Chinese who for profit's sake pander to British opinion, but into what beneath its froth (admittedly a worse froth than ours) the Chinese press is thinking and hoping and recording. And for this there is need of journalists in much closer touch with China than the average Treaty Port journalist is at the present time.

And of those who do our thinking for us, those who write for quarterlies and monthlies, those who teach political science, those whose minds play with the problems of peoples and the ordering of their corporate life, we will insistently demand more and more thought about China. We will urge them to realize the importance and absorbing interest of Chinese life and thought and practice, and beg them to realize how much of what is diseased in the relations between Britain and China is due to them, the nation's political theorists—to their failure to be as interested in China as they are in the countries and peoples with whom we have more numerous and immediate links. Just because other links with China are fewer, we will insist that they

make this link stronger even than it is with other countries.

And of our government we shall demand serious recognition of the most fatal weakness of all in the whole system of Sino-British relations. Our concern with China in the past has always been a commercial concern. China's concern with us has always been a political concern. Our political actions will always fail if they are dominated by a commercial mind and have merely a commercial objective. Our dealings with China must be dealings between the British people and the Chinese people; not, as so much at present, between the Chinese people and British merchants. We will insist that our interest as a people in China as a people dominates our foreign policy, and that the "China-as-a-market" attitude of mind find its true place in the total expression of our national mind—a vital, perhaps a central place, but essentially a subordinate one. We do not live for shop-keeping. We live for life. Our national policy must express that national purpose.

Perhaps in some such ways we shall in our generation do something to settle the question of equality which for more than a hundred years now has vexed Sino-British relations.

One last word to those who share or who would like to share the Christian faith. Have we as Christians a specific additional responsibility? We have, I believe, not only an additional responsibility but an additional advantage.

By His incarnation in Christ and by the continued indwelling of the risen Christ Spirit God has created and continues to indwell in a particular way the Christian fellowship. It is a special fellowship of His power for the healing of human ills and the fulfilment of the Divine purpose in creation. In this fellowship all British and Chinese Christian communities are joined in a very sacred bond. We are that fellowship of His power—not by any mechanical use of us as His instruments, but by His co-operation with us as Father. That is our advantage. Our responsibility —literally an awe-full responsibility—is co-operation with this prodigal Father-Love as sons, as the living Body of the supreme Son, Jesus Christ.

We must, therefore, as a fellowship and as individuals, hold on when others fail in the difficult and costly task of human brotherhood in action. Some aspects of what that means in our relations with China I have just described. Whatever others do who have not our faith in God, in His power, and in His purpose, we must not yield to feelings of resentment, or to fear, or to despondency. We must not accept even failure as futile.

And we must endeavour, as a fellowship and as individuals, to be as reckless in our experiments in brotherhood as the spirit of our God indwelling our fellowship has been and is still reckless in His prodigal love of His creation. We must be not only the "leaven" and the "living conscience" of our nation, not only its suffering servant, glad to do the dirty work it cannot or will not undertake, but

pioneers in the new-found expression of that Creative Love into whose Body we claim to have been called. So may all mankind and all human relations come into the fullness of the measure of the stature of Christ—not only in His divine sonship, but in His sublime brotherliness.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY—FOR THE PLAIN MAN

I. GENERAL

A. A Treaty Port View

The Truth about the Chinese Republic. By H. G. W. Woodhead. (Hurst and Blackett, 15s.)

A thoroughly readable and reliable book; written quite definitely from the British point of view.

B. A pro-Chinese View

The Problem of China. By Bertrand Russell. (Allen and Unwin, 7s. 6d.)

Discount Mr Russell's petulant dislike for the capitalist system and the Y.M.C.A., and the book then gives a fair and understanding appreciation of China as many Chinese see China to-day.

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China To-day through Chinese Eyes. Second Series. (Student Christian Movement, 2s. 6d.)

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IV. RELIGION

There is no adequate book in English on Chinese religious life, but

A. *Chinese Religious Ideas.* By P. J. Maclagan (Student Christian Movement, 6s.), and

B. *The Quest for God in China.* By F. W. S. O'Niell. (Allen and Unwin, 7s. 6d.)

are the best available. Of these the latter is the more popular and deals with current movements and influences, and the former is more systematic in its analysis of the religious doctrines of the Chinese Masters.

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