

" 'This tree neither Paul planted, nor Apollos watered, nor God increased.' In like sort Leo saith¹, 'What needeth it to believe that thing that neither the Law hath taught, nor the Prophets have spoken, nor the Gospel hath preached, nor the Apostles have delivered?' And again², 'How are the new devices brought in that our Fathers never knew?' St. Augustine, having reckoned up a great number of the Bishops of Rome, by a general negative saith thus³; 'In all this order of succession of bishops there is not one bishop found that was a Donatist.' St. Gregory being himself a Bishop of Rome, and writing against the title of *Universal Bishop*, saith thus⁴, 'None of all my predecessors ever consented to use this ungodly title; no Bishop of Rome ever took upon him this name of singularity.' By such negatives, M. Harding, we reprove the vanity and novelty of your religion; we tell you, none of the catholic ancient learned Fathers either Greek or Latin, ever used either your private mass, or your half communion, or your barbarous unknown prayers. Paul never planted them, Apollos never watered them, God never increased them; they are of yourselves, they are not of God."

In all this there is not a syllable which any way crosseth us. For concerning arguments negative even taken from human authority, they are here proved to be in some cases very strong and forcible. They are not in our estimation idle reproofs, when the authors of needless innovations are opposed with such negatives as that of Leo, "How are these new devices brought in which our Fathers never knew?" When their grave and reverend superiors do reckon up unto them as Augustine did unto the Donatists, large catalogues of Fathers wondered at for their wisdom, piety, and learning⁵, amongst

¹ Epist. xciii. c. 12. [p. 167, ed. Paris. 1639: "Quid opus est in cor admittere quod lex non docuit, quod prophetia non cecinit, quod Evangelii veritas non prædicavit, quod Apostolica doctrina non tradidit?"]

² Epist. xcvi. c. 5. ["Quomodo... nova inducuntur, quæ nostri nunquam sensere majores?"] Quoted by S. Leo from S. Ambrose, de Incarn. Dom. c. 6.]

³ Epist. clxv. [al. 53. t. ii. 121.

"In hoc ordine successionis nullus Donatista episcopus invenitur."]

⁴ Lib. iv. Ep. 32. ["Nemo decessorum meorum hoc tam profano vocabulo uti censuit: nullus Romanorum Pontificum hoc singularitatis nomen assumpsit."]

⁵ [S. Aug. Ep. 53. (al. 165.) § 2. "Si ordo episcoporum sibi succedentium considerandus est, quanto certius et vere salubriter ab ipso Petro numeramus, cui totius Ecclesiæ figuram gerenti

whom for so many ages before us no one did ever so think of the Church's affairs as now the world doth begin to be persuaded; surely by us they are not taught to take exception hereat, because such arguments are negative. Much less when the like are taken from the sacred authority of Scripture, if the matter itself do bear them. For in truth the question is not, whether an argument from Scripture negatively may be good, but whether it be so generally good, that in all actions men may urge it. The Fathers I grant do use very general and large terms, even as Hiero the king did in speaking of Archimedes, "From henceforward, whatsoever Archimedes speaketh, it must be believed¹." His meaning was not that Archimedes could simply in nothing be deceived, but that he had in such sort approved his skill, that he seemed worthy of credit for ever after in matters appertaining unto the science he was skilful in. In speaking thus largely it is presumed that men's speeches will be taken according to the matter whereof they speak. Let any man therefore that carrieth indifferency of judgment peruse the bishop's speeches, and consider well of those negatives concerning Scripture, which he produceth out of Irenæus, Chrysostom and Leo²;

"Dominus ait, 'Super hanc petram

ædificabo Ecclesiam meam, et

portæ inferorum non vincent eam.

Petro enim successit Linus; Lino,

Clemens; Clementi, Anacletus;

Anacleto, Evaristus; Evaristo,

Alexander; Alexandro, Sixtus;

Sixto, Telesphorus; Telesphoro,

Iginus; Iginio, Anicetus; Aniceto,

Pius; Pio, Soter; Soteri, Eleutherius;

Eleutherio, Victor; Victori,

Zephirinus; Zephirino, Calixtus;

Calixto, Urbanus; Urbano, Pon-

tianus; Pontiano, Antherus; An-

thero, Fabianus; Fabiano, Corne-

lius; Cornelio, Lucius; Lucio,

Stephanus; Stephano, Xystus;

Xysto, Dionysius; Dionysio, Felix;

Felici, Eutychianus; Eutychiano,

Gaius; Gaio, Marcellinus; Mar-

cellino, Marcellus; Marcello, Eu-

sebius; Eusebio, Miltiades; Mil-

tiadi, Sylvester; Sylvestro, Marcus;

Marco, Julius; Julio, Liberius;

Liberio, Damasus; Damaso, Si-

ricius; Siricio, Anastasius. In hoc

ordine successionis nullus Dona-

tista Episcopus invenitur."]

¹ [Proclus in Euclid, II. 3. Montucla, Hist. des Mathématiques, I. 230.]

² [S. Irenæus, I. i. 15, (after a minute exposition of the Valentinian doctrine of Æons :) Τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς ὑποθέσεως αὐτῶν οὐσης, ἣν οὐτε Προφῆται ἐκήρυξαν, οὔτε ὁ Κύριος ἐδίδαξεν, οὔτε Ἀπόστολοι παρέδωκαν, ἣν περὶ τῶν ὁλῶν αὐχοῦσι πλείον τῶν ἄλλων ἐγνωκεῖναι, ἐξ ἀγράφων ἀναγνώσκοντες, καὶ τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον, ἐξ ἄμμου σχοινία πλέκειν ἐπιτηδεύοντες, ἀξιοπίστως προσαρμῶζειν πειρῶνται τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἥτοι παραβολὰς κυριακάς, ἢ ῥήσεις προφητικάς, ἢ λόγους Ἀποστολικούς, ἵνα τὸ πλάσμα αὐτῶν μὴ ἀμάρτυρον εἶναι δοκῇ.]

S. Chrysostom, VI. p. 402, 3, (speaking of one of the most offensive modifications of Arianism;) Ἡ τῶν Ἀνομοίων ἐρρωθεῖσα ψυχὴ, καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν γραφῶν ἐπιμελείας οὐκ ἀπολαύσασα, οἴκοθεν καὶ παρ' ἐαυτῆς τὴν ἀγρίαν ταύτην καὶ ἀνήμερον ἐξέβρασεν αἵρεσιν· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ δέν-

BOOK II. which three are chosen from amongst the residue, because the
 Ch. vii. 1, 2. sentences of the others (even as one of theirs also) do make
 for defence of negative arguments taken from human authority,
 and not from divine only. They mention no more restraint
 in the one than in the other; yet I think themselves will not
 hereby judge, that the Fathers took both to be strong, without
 restraint unto any special kind of matter wherein they held
 such arguments forcible. Nor doth the bishop either say or
 prove any more, than that an argument in some kinds of mat-
 ter may be good, although taken negatively from Scripture.

Their opin-
 ion con-
 cerning the
 force of
 arguments
 taken from
 human au-
 thority for
 the order-
 ing of men's
 actions or
 persua-
 sions.

VII. An earnest desire to draw all things unto the deter-
 mination of bare and naked Scripture hath caused here much
 pains to be taken in abating the estimation and credit of man.
 Which if we labour to maintain as far as truth and reason will
 bear, let not any think that we travail about a matter not
 greatly needful. For the scope of all their pleading against
 man's authority is, to overthrow such orders, laws, and con-
 stitutions in the Church, as depending thereupon if they should
 therefore be taken away, would peradventure leave neither
 face nor memory of Church to continue long in the world, the
 world especially being such as now it is. That which they
 have in this case spoken I would for brevity's sake let pass,
 but that the drift of their speech being so dangerous, their
 words are not to be neglected.

[2.] Wherefore to say that simply an argument taken from
 man's authority doth hold no way, "neither affirmatively nor
 "negatively¹," is hard. By a man's authority we here
 understand the force which his word hath for the assurance
 of another's mind that buildeth upon it; as the Apostle some-
 what did upon their report of the house of Chloe²; and the

δρον οὐ Παῦλος ἐφύτευεν, οὐκ Ἀπολ-
 λῶς ἐπότισεν, οὐχ ὁ Θεὸς ᾠξήσεν
 ἀλλ' ἐφύτευσε μὲν λογισμῶν ἀκαιρος
 περιεργία, ἐπότισε δὲ ἀπονοίας τύφος,
 ᾠξήσεν δὲ φιλοδοξίας ἔρως.

S. Leo, as before, Ep. xciii. c. 12.]

¹ T. C. lib. i. p. 25. [13.] "When
 "the question is of the authority of
 "a man, it holdeth neither affirm-
 "atively nor negatively. The reason
 "is, because the infirmity of man
 "can neither attain to the perfection
 "of any thing whereby he might
 "speak all things that are to be

"spoken of it, neither yet be free
 "from error in those things which
 "he speaketh or giveth out. And
 "therefore this argument neither
 "affirmatively nor negatively com-
 "pelleth the hearer, but only in-
 "duceth him to some liking or dis-
 "liking of that for which it is
 "brought, and is rather for an ora-
 "tor to persuade the simpler sort
 "than for a disputer to enforce him
 "that is learned."

² 1 Cor. i. 11.

BOOK II. Samaritans in a matter of far greater moment upon the report
 Ch. vii. 2. of a simple woman. For so it is said in St. John's Gospel,
 "Many of the Samaritans of that city believed in him for the
 "saying of the woman, which testified, He hath told me all
 "things that ever I did¹."

The strength of man's authority is affirmatively such that
 the weightiest affairs in the world depend thereon. In judg-
 ment and justice are not hereupon proceedings grounded?
 Saith not the Law that "in the mouth of two or three wit-
 "nesses every word shall be confirmed²?" This the law of
 God would not say, if there were in a man's testimony no
 force at all to prove any thing.

And if it be admitted that in matter of fact there is some
 credit to be given to the testimony of man, but not in matter
 of opinion and judgment; we see the contrary both acknow-
 ledged and universally practised also throughout the world.
 The sentences of wise and expert men were never but highly
 esteemed. Let the title of a man's right be called in question;
 are we not bold to rely and build upon the judgment of such
 as are famous for their skill in the laws of this land? In
 matter of state the weight many times of some one man's
 authority is thought reason sufficient, even to sway over whole
 nations.

And this not only "with the simpler sort;" but the learn-
 ed and wiser we are, the more such arguments in some
 cases prevail with us. The reason why the simpler sort are
 moved with authority is the conscience of their own ignorance;
 whereby it cometh to pass that having learned men in admir-
 ation, they rather fear to dislike them than know wherefore
 they should allow and follow their judgments. Contrariwise
 with them that are skilful authority is much more strong and
 forcible; because they only are able to discern how just
 cause there is why to some men's authority so much should
 be attributed. For which cause the name of Hippocrates (no
 doubt) were more effectual to persuade even such men as
 Galen himself, than to move a silly empiric. So that the
 very selfsame argument in this kind which doth but induce
 the vulgar sort to like, may constrain the wiser to yield. And
 therefore not orators only with the people, but even the very

¹ iv. 39.

² Deut. xix. 15; Matt. xviii. 16.

BOOK II. profoundest disputers in all faculties have hereby often with
Ch. vii. 3. the best learned prevailed most.

As for arguments taken from human authority and that negatively; for example sake, if we should think the assembling of the people of God together by the sound of a bell, the presenting of infants at the holy font by such as commonly we call their godfathers, or any other the like received custom, to be impious, because some men of whom we think very reverently have in their books and writings nowhere mentioned or taught that such things should be in the Church; this reasoning were subject unto just reproof, it were but feeble, weak, and unsound. Notwithstanding even negatively an argument from human authority may be strong, as namely thus: The Chronicles of England mention no more than only six kings bearing the name of Edward since the time of the last conquest; therefore it cannot be there should be more. So that if the question be of the authority of a man's testimony, we cannot simply avouch either that affirmatively it doth not any way hold; or that it hath only force to induce the simpler sort, and not to constrain men of understanding and ripe judgment to yield assent; or that negatively it hath in it no strength at all. For unto every of these the contrary is most plain.

[3.] Neither doth that which is alleged concerning the infirmity of men overthrow or disprove this. Men are blinded with ignorance and error; many things may escape them, and in many things they may be deceived; yea, those things which they do know they may either forget, or upon sundry indirect considerations let pass; and although themselves do not err, yet may they through malice or vanity even of purpose deceive others. Howbeit infinite cases there are wherein all these impediments and lets are so manifestly excluded, that there is no show or colour whereby any such exception may be taken, but that the testimony of man will stand as a ground of infallible assurance. That there is a city of Rome, that Pius Quintus and Gregory the Thirteenth and others have been Popes of Rome, I suppose we are certainly enough persuaded. The ground of our persuasion, who never saw the place nor persons beforenamed, can be nothing but man's testimony. Will any man here notwithstanding allege those

mentioned human infirmities, as reasons why these things should be mistrusted or doubted of?

Yea, that which is more, utterly to infringe the force and strength of man's testimony were to shake the very fortress of God's truth. For whatsoever we believe concerning salvation by Christ, although the Scripture be therein the ground of our belief; yet the authority of man is, if we mark it, the key which openeth the door of entrance into the knowledge of the Scripture. The Scripture could not teach us the things that are of God, unless we did credit men who have taught us that the words of Scripture do signify those things. Some way therefore, notwithstanding man's infirmity, yet his authority may enforce assent.

[4.] Upon better advice and deliberation so much is perceived, and at the length confest; that arguments taken from the authority of men may not only so far forth as hath been declared, but further also be of some force in "human sciences;" which force be it never so small, doth shew that they are not utterly naught. But in "matters divine" it is still maintained stiffly, that they have no manner force at all¹. Howbeit, the very selfsame reason, which causeth to yield that they are of some force in the one, will at the length constrain also to acknowledge that they are not in the other altogether unforcible. For if the natural strength of man's wit may by experience and study attain unto such ripeness in the knowledge of things human, that men in this respect may

¹ T. C. lib. ii. p. 19: "Although that kind of argument of authority of men is good neither in human nor divine sciences; yet it hath some small force in human sciences, (forasmuch as naturally, and in that he is a man, he may come to some ripeness of judgment in those sciences,) which in divine matters hath no force at all; as of him which naturally, and as he is a man, can no more judge of them than a blind man of colours. Yea so far is it from drawing credit, if it be barely spoken without reason and testimony of Scripture, that it carrieth also a suspicion of untruth whatsoever proceedeth from him; which the Apostle did

"well note, when, to signify a thing corruptly spoken, and against the truth, he saith, that 'it is spoken according to man,' Rom. iii. He saith not, 'as a wicked and lying man,' but simply, 'as a man.' And although this corruption be reformed in many, yet for so much as in whom the knowledge of the truth is most advanced there remaineth both ignorance and disordered affections (whereof either of them turneth him from speaking of the truth), no man's authority, with the Church especially and those that are called and persuaded of the authority of the Word of God, can bring any assurance unto the conscience."

BOOK II.
Ch. vii. 4.

presume to build somewhat upon their judgment ; what reason have we to think but that even in matters divine, the like wits furnished with necessary helps, exercised in Scripture with like diligence, and assisted with the grace of Almighty God, may grow unto so much perfection of knowledge, that men shall have just cause, when any thing pertinent unto faith and religion is doubted of, the more willingly to incline their minds towards that which the sentence of so grave, wise, and learned in that faculty shall judge most sound ? For the controversy is of the weight of such men's judgments. Let it therefore be suspected ; let it be taken as gross, corrupt, repugnant unto the truth, whatsoever concerning things divine above nature shall at any time be spoken as out of the mouths of mere natural men, which have not the eyes where-with heavenly things are discerned. For this we contend not. But whom God hath endued with principal gifts to aspire unto knowledge by ; whose exercises, labours, and divine studies he hath so blessed that the world for their great and rare skill that way hath them in singular admiration ; may we reject even their judgment likewise, as being utterly of no moment ? For mine own part, I dare not so lightly esteem of the Church, and of the principal pillars therein.

[5.] The truth is, that the mind of man desireth evermore to know the truth according to the most infallible certainty which the nature of things can yield. The greatest assurance generally with all men is that which we have by plain aspect and intuitive beholding. Where we cannot attain unto this, there what appeareth to be true by strong and invincible demonstration, such as wherein it is not by any way possible to be deceived, thereunto the mind doth necessarily assent, neither is it in the choice thereof to do otherwise. And in case these both do fail, then which way greatest probability leadeth, thither the mind doth evermore incline. Scripture with Christian men being received as the Word of God ; that for which we have probable, yea, that which we have necessary reason for, yea, that which we see with our eyes, is not thought so sure as that which the Scripture of God teacheth ; because we hold that his speech revealeth there what himself seeth, and therefore the strongest proof of all, and the most necessarily assented unto by us (which do thus receive the Scripture) is

the Scripture. Now it is not required or can be exacted at our hands, that we should yield unto any thing other assent, than such as doth answer the evidence which is to be had of that we assent unto. For which cause even in matters divine, concerning some things we may lawfully doubt and suspend our judgment, inclining neither to one side nor other ; as namely touching the time of the fall both of man and angels : of some things we may very well retain an opinion that they are probable and not unlikely to be true, as when we hold that men have their souls rather by creation than propagation, or that the Mother of our Lord lived always in the state of virginity as well after his birth as before (for of these two the one, her virginity before, is a thing which of necessity we must believe ; the other, her continuance in the same state always, hath more likelihood of truth than the contrary) ; finally in all things then are our consciences best resolved, and in most agreeable sort unto God and nature settled, when they are so far persuaded as those grounds of persuasion which are to be had will bear.

Which thing I do so much the rather set down, for that I see how a number of souls are for want of right information in this point oftentimes grievously vexed. When bare and unbuilt conclusions are put into their minds, they finding not themselves to have thereof any great certainty, imagine that this proceedeth only from lack of faith, and that the Spirit of God doth not work in them as it doth in true believers ; by this means their hearts are much troubled, they fall into anguish and perplexity : whereas the truth is, that how bold and confident soever we may be in words, when it cometh to the point of trial, such as the evidence is which the truth hath either in itself or through proof, such is the heart's assent thereunto ; neither can it be stronger, being grounded as it should be.

I grant that proof derived from the authority of man's judgment is not able to work that assurance which doth grow by a stronger proof ; and therefore although ten thousand general councils would set down one and the same definitive sentence concerning any point of religion whatsoever, yet one demonstrative reason alleged, or one manifest testimony cited from the mouth of God himself to the contrary, could not

choose but overweigh them all; inasmuch as for them to have been deceived it is not impossible; it is, that demonstrative reason or testimony divine should deceive. Howbeit in defect of proof infallible, because the mind doth rather follow probable persuasions than approve the things that have in them no likelihood of truth at all; surely if a question concerning matter of doctrine were proposed, and on the one side no kind of proof appearing, there should on the other be alleged and shewed that so a number of the learnedest divines in the world have ever thought; although it did not appear what reason or what Scripture led them to be of that judgment, yet to their very bare judgment somewhat a reasonable man would attribute, notwithstanding the common imbecilities which are incident into our nature.

[6.] And whereas it is thought, that especially with "the Church, and those that are called and persuaded of the 'authority of the Word of God, man's authority'" with them especially "should not prevail;" it must and doth prevail even with them, yea with them especially, as far as equity requireth; and farther we maintain it not¹. For men to be

¹ T. C. lib. ii. p. 21: "Of divers sentences of the Fathers themselves (whereby some have likened them to brute beasts without reason which suffer themselves to be led by the judgment and authority of others, some have preferred the judgment of one simple rude man alleging reason unto companies of learned men) I will content myself at this time with two or three sentences. Irenæus saith, Whatsoever is to be shewed in the Scripture cannot be shewed but out of the Scriptures themselves. lib. iii. cap. 12. Jerome saith, 'No man be he never so holy or eloquent hath any authority after the Apostles:' in Ps. lxxxvi. Augustine saith, 'That he will believe none how godly and learned soever he be, unless he confirm his sentence by the Scriptures, or by some reason not contrary to them.' Ep. 18." [al. 82. t. ii. p. 190.] "And in another place, Hear this, the Lord saith; Hear not this, Donatus saith, Rogatus saith,

"Vincentius saith, Hilarius saith, Ambrose saith, Augustine saith, but hearken unto this, The Lord saith. Ep. 48." [al. 93. c. 6. Opp. t. ii. p. 239. It may be questioned whether this place is at all relevant to Cartwright's purpose. *Glorificatum est nomen meum in gentibus, dicit Dominus. Audi, dicit Dominus; non, dicit Donatus, aut Rogatus, aut Vincentius, aut Hilarius, aut Ambrosius, aut Augustinus; sed, dicit Dominus; cum legitur, Et benedicentur in eo omnes tribus terræ . . . Et replebitur gloria ejus omnis terra, fiat, fiat.* Et tu sedes Cartennis, et cum decem Rogatistis, qui remansistis, dicis, *Non fiat, non fiat.*] "And again, having to do with an Arian, he affirmeth that neither he ought to bring forth the Council of Nice, nor the other the Council of Arimine, thereby to bring prejudice each to other; neither ought the Arian to be holden by the authority of the one nor himself by the authority of the other, but by the Scriptures,

tied and led by authority, as it were with a kind of captivity of judgment, and though there be reason to the contrary not to listen unto it, but to follow like beasts the first in the herd, they know not nor care not whither, this were brutish. Again, that authority of men should prevail with men either against or above Reason, is no part of our belief. "Companies of learned men" be they never so great and renowned, are to yield unto Reason; the weight whereof is no whit prejudiced by the simplicity of his person which doth allege it, but being found to be sound and good, the bare opinion of men to the contrary must of necessity stoop and give place.

Irenæus¹, writing against Marcion, which held one God author of the Old Testament and another of the New, to prove that the Apostles preached the same God which was known before to the Jews, he copiously allegeth sundry their sermons and speeches uttered concerning that matter and recorded in Scripture. And lest any should be wearied with such store of allegations, in the end he concludeth, "While we labour for these demonstrations out of Scripture, and do summarily declare the things which many ways have been

"which are witnesses proper to neither but common to both, matter with matter, cause with cause, reason with reason, ought to be debated. Cont. Max. Arian. lib. iii. c. 14." [al. lib. ii. c. 14. § 3. t. viii. 704. Nec nunc ego Nicænum, nec tu debes Ariminense tanquam præjudicaturus proferre concilium. Nec ego hujus auctoritate, nec tu illius detineris. Scripturarum auctoritatibus, non quorumque propriis, sed utrisque communibus testibus, res cum re, causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione concertet.] "And in another place against Petilian the Donatist he saith, Let not these words be heard between us, I say, You say; let us hear this, Thus saith the Lord. And by and by speaking of the Scriptures he saith, There let us seek the Church, there let us try the cause. De Unit. Eccles. cap. 5." [cap. 2, 3. Inter nos et Donatistas questio est, ubi sit hoc corpus: i. e. ubi sit Ecclesia. Quid ergo facturi sumus? in

verbis nostris eam quæsituri; an in verbis capituli sui, Domini nostri Jesu Christi? Puto, quod in illius potius verbis eam quærere debemus, qui Veritas est, et optime novit corpus suum. . . . In verbis nostris Ecclesiam quæri nolumus. . . . c. 5. Non audiamus, "Hæc dicis, hoc dico," sed audiamus, "Hæc dicit Dominus." Sunt certe libri Dominici, quorum auctoritati utrique consentimus, utrique cedimus, utrique servimus: ibi quæramus Ecclesiam, ibi discutiamus causam nostram.] "Hereby [here] it is manifest that the argument of the authority of man affirmatively is nothing worth."

¹ [P. 230. ed. Grabe. "Nobis autem conlaborantibus his ostensionibus quæ ex Scripturis sunt, et quæ multifarie dicta sunt breviter et compendiose annuntiantibus, et tu cum magnanimitate attende eis, et non longiloquium puta; hoc intelligens: quoniam," &c.]